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Abstract
This paper examines peer e¤ects in consumption in context of a less developed country. Specif-
ically, the question that I seek to answer is whether consumption expenditure of a household is
inuenced by that of its peers in a less developed country. To examine this question, I use newly
available household level data from India. I dene a households peer group as other households
living in its village/neighborhood. In assessing the inuences of peers in this context, there are
two key empirical challenges including shared group-level unobservables, and simultaneity of peer
inuences. I address these issues by using an instrumental variables/xed e¤ects approach that
compares households in the same district but di¤erent villages/neighborhoods who are thus ex-
posed to di¤erent sets of peers. In particular, I use plausibly exogenous variation in idiosyncratic
expenditure shocks which are accidental and negative in nature  faced by peers as instru-
ments for peersconsumption expenditure. Preferred specication suggests that a one standard
deviation increase in average consumption expenditure of a households peers causes the house-
holds own consumption expenditure to increase by 0.42 standard deviations. Falsication tests
and robustness checks support the validity of my results. My ndings suggest that policies that
inuence a households consumption will also a¤ect the consumption of the households peers
through social interactions. This implies traditional analyses of consumption intervention pro-
grams that do not take into account such spillover e¤ects will understate the total social impact
of the programs, and hence lead to inaccurate evaluation of cost-e¤ectiveness of such programs.
Keywords: consumption, endogeneity, India, instrumental variables, peer e¤ects, status-seeking
behavior
JEL Classication: C21, D12, O12, Z13
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Abstract
This paper examines peer e¤ects in consumption in context of a less developed country. Specif-
ically, the question that I seek to answer is whether consumption expenditure of a household is
inuenced by that of its peers in a less developed country. To examine this question, I use newly
available household level data from India. I dene a households peer group as other households
living in its village/neighborhood. In assessing the inuences of peers in this context, there
are two key empirical challenges including shared group-level unobservables, and simultaneity
of peer inuences. I address these issues by using an instrumental variables/xed e¤ects ap-
proach that compares households in the same district but di¤erent villages/neighborhoods who
are thus exposed to di¤erent sets of peers. In particular, I use plausibly exogenous variation in
idiosyncratic expenditure shocks (which are accidental and negative in nature) faced by peers as
instruments for peersconsumption expenditure. Preferred specication suggests that a 1 Indian
Rupee increase in consumption expenditure of a households peers causes the households own
consumption expenditure to increase by 0.7 Indian Rupee. Falsication tests and robustness
checks support the validity of my results. My ndings suggest that policies that inuence a
households consumption will also a¤ect the consumption of the households peers through social
interactions. This implies traditional analyses of consumption intervention programs that do not
take into account such spillover e¤ects will understate the total social impact of the programs,
and hence lead to inaccurate evaluation of cost-e¤ectiveness of such programs.
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1 Introduction
Consumption of households is traditionally modeled as being a function of their own income and prefer-
ences. However, it is often thought that a households peersconsumption expenditure plays a major role in
determining its own consumption expenditure. As famously noted by Duesenberry (1949), the strength of
any households desire to increase its consumption expenditure is a function of the ratio of its expenditure
to some weighted average of the expenditure of others with whom it comes in contact. In this paper, I
empirically study peer e¤ects in household consumption specically in context of a less developed country.
More precisely, I attempt to address the following question: Does consumption expenditure of households
peers a¤ect their own consumption expenditure in a less developed country? I examine this question using
newly available household level data from India which is home to one-third of the worlds poor.1
There are at least two reasons why a careful analysis of peer e¤ects in consumption in context of low
income countries is crucial. First, understanding the magnitude and nature of peer e¤ects is imperative for
accurate evaluation of consumption intervention programs (e.g., consumption tax policies, conditional cash
transfer programs, etc.) that are used massively in low income countries as developmental policies. This is
because, if there are non-negligible peer e¤ects, such policies, in addition to having a direct e¤ect, would
have an indirect spillover e¤ect.2 If this is not taken into account, the total social e¤ectof the policies
would be underestimated.
Secondly, if consumption of householdspeers a¤ect their own consumption in a positive way, ceteris
paribus, this would imply that the households must be lowering their savings or taking up loans to nance
their increase in consumption when peer consumption rises. This is likely to magnify the risk of poor and
middle income households (who make up the majority of the population in any low income country) of
getting trapped in poverty (or severely hamper their ability to move out of poverty traps) and increase their
economic vulnerability in the long run owing to under-savingor over-borrowing(Moav and Neeman, 2012).
Thus nding evidence of positive peer e¤ects would highlight the importance of formulating innovative social
policies that represses social pressure and using such policies in conjunction with traditional anti-poverty
and redistributive policies in order to augment social welfare.3
I begin by constructing a simple model of social interactions in consumption to guide my empirics. The
model allows for both endogenous peer e¤ects (peer e¤ects due to peer consumption) as well as exogenous
peer e¤ects (peer e¤ects due to peer characteristics). The model is constructed by adjusting a standard
model of consumer choice with a social utility component that captures the satisfaction that a household
1http://time.com/2999550/india-home-to-most-poor-people/
2Also referred to as social multiplier e¤ect(Akerlof, 1997; Glaeser et al., 2003).
3As suggested by Putnam (2007), a policy that would repress social pressure might be promotion of a broad sense of we
among members of the same community or reference groups through popular culture, education and common experiences.
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gets from status-seeking behavior. In other words, it is the utility that a household obtains from getting
ahead of others in its peer group in terms of consumption spending. My model predicts a positive monotonic
relationship between own and average peer consumption expenditure. I empirically test this prediction using
data from the 2012 Indian Human Development Survey (Desai et al., 2015). I dene a households peer
group as other households living in its village (for rural areas) or neighborhood (for urban areas) since
people almost certainly compare themselves to their immediate geographical neighbors(Deaton, 2001, p.
21). Fafchamps and Shilpi (2008), in fact, note that since social mobility is very low in low income countries
as a result of which people live along people they grew up with, immediate neighbors constitute almost a
naturalpeer group for people in living in these countries.
As noted by Manski (1993), identication of endogenous peer e¤ects is notoriously di¢ cult. More
specically, there are two econometric problems that hamper inferences about peer inuences on household
behavior. The rst problem that arises is due to a simultaneity bias. This bias is generated by a reection
problemthe simultaneous determination of own and peer outcome (which is consumption in the present
case). The second factor complicating identication and estimation of peer inuences is an omitted variables
bias. In the absence of a perfect set of controls, one cannot validate a peer inuence on consumption by
observing that a group of neighbors spend similar amounts of resources on consumption. Inferences will be
biased whenever there are group level unobservables that are correlated with consumption expenditure of all
those belonging to the group (i.e., correlated unobservables).4
In the present paper, I tackle these problems based on a strategy of instrumental variables (IV)/xed
e¤ects. I create my instruments based on assumptions invoked in my theoretical model. Specically, my
model assumes that a household faces various idiosyncratic shocks that a¤ects its own consumption, and some
of these shocks are observable (to the econometrician). I further assume that these shocks are household
specic. In other words, it is only the own idiosyncratic shocks that a¤ect own consumption and peer
idiosyncratic shocks do not have any inuence on own consumption. As argued by Helmers and Patnam
(2014, p. 95), this is a credible assumption given the idiosyncratic nature of the shocks.
The above assumptions allow me to instrument average peer consumption (which is the source of the
simultaneity bias) by average peer observable idiosyncratic shocks, and thankfully, the IHDS 2012 has data on
some such shocks (e.g., death of a household member, accident/injury, job loss, incident of crime, etc). The
intuition is that since own idiosyncratic shocks a¤ect own consumption and do not contain any information
about consumption of other households, to this extent, average peer idiosyncratic shocks should a¤ect average
4Another source of correlated unobservables is non-random sorting of households into peer groups since this would imply
that unobservable characteristics of households are correlated with the characteristics of the group. However, as I argue in
section 4, this is unlikely to be a cause of concern in the present case since social mobility at the household level is very low in
India.
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peer consumption and that there should not be any e¤ect of average peer idiosyncratic shocks on the target
households consumption after conditioning on own idiosyncratic shocks (to show that my instruments are
plausibly exogenous, I carry out balancing tests (Bifulco et al., 2011; Lavy and Schlosser, 2011) and other
standard IV diagnostic tests). I also include a full set of district xed e¤ects to control for group level
unobservables that might be correlated with peer characteristics and/or peer idiosyncratic shocks.
My IV/xed e¤ects strategy is similar to the spatial IVmethod used widely in empirical spatial literature
(for an overview see Gibbons and Overman, 2012; Gibbons et al. 2015). The strategy requires some/all
exogenous characteristics of neighboring spatial units (the spatial units being households in my case) to
be used as instruments for spatial interaction term which is endogenous. The major requirements for this
strategy, thus, is to carefully justify why such characteristics might potentially a¤ect a spatial units own
outcome but not the outcome of its neighbors. This approach has recently been used in some papers in the
peer e¤ects literature including Gaviria and Raphael (2001), Goux and Maurin (2007), Fletcher (2010, 2012,
2015), Helmers and Patnam (2014) and McVicar and Polanski (2014).
The IV/xed e¤ects-based identication strategy used in this paper not only allows one to clearly identify
endogenous peer e¤ects, but also has the advantage of being fairly exible in terms of data requirement.
Alternative methods, although novel and unique, are either unable to isolate endogenous peer e¤ects from
exogenous ones (e.g., Sacerdote, 2001; Graham, 2008; Ammermueller and Pischke, 2009), or do so at the
cost of being extremely restrictive in terms of data requirement. For instance, the method proposed by Lee
(2007) and developed later by Bramoulle et al. (2009) allows one to identify endogenous peer e¤ects but
requires peer groups to be smallon average and that there should be su¢ cient variation in peer group size.
Again, using the empirical strategies proposed by Bramoulle et al. (2009), Calvo-Armengol et al. (2009) and
Lee et al. (2010) to isolate endogenous peer e¤ects from exogenous ones requires a researcher to be able to
observe all social interaction links in the data (that is, the researcher must have very detailed network data).
Such requirements are not met by most micro datasets, including the dataset used in the present paper.
My results are striking. In consonance with the prediction of the theory of status-seeking behavior, I
nd robust evidence that average peer consumption has a signicant positive impact on householdsown
consumption. More specically, I nd that an increase in average peer consumption expenditure by 1 Indian
Rupee causes an average household to increase its own spending by 0.7 Indian Rupee. This translates into
a social multiplier of about 3. Further, I nd that the increase in own consumption due to a one standard
deviation increase in average peer consumption is exactly equal to the increase in own consumption due
to a one standard deviation increase in a households own income. Thus, the estimated endogenous peer
e¤ect is not only economically signicant in absolute terms, but is also remarkably strong compared to
other major determinants of consumption. Additionally, results of my subsample analysis suggest that the
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point estimates of the endogenous peer e¤ect is signicantly higher for non-poor households compared to
the households who fall below the poverty line.
Over the last few years, a sizable body of literature on peer inuences in consumption has emerged.
However, much of the existing research on this topic focuses on developed countries. One of the earliest
empirical studies in this literature is that by Grinblatt et al. (2008). Using Finnish data, they provide
evidence of endogenous peer e¤ects in automobile purchases. Kuhn et al. (2011), using data from the
Dutch Postcode Lottery (PCL), also nd signicant peer e¤ects in car consumption. Moretti (2011), in an
interesting paper, estimate peer e¤ects and social multiplier in consumption of movies using high quality
box-o¢ ce data from the United States. De Giorgi et al. (2016) exploit detailed network data in a recent
working paper to show the existence of non-negligible peer e¤ects in aggregate consumption in context of
Denmark.
The only two studies that I am aware of which focus on understanding neighborhood and peer e¤ects in
context of low income countries are those by Angelucci and De Giorgi (2009), and Angelucci et al. (2017).5
Both these studies, using data from Progresa, which is a program that targets poor households in small rural
communities in Mexico with bimonthly conditional grants to improve living standards, nd strong evidence
of positive program externalities on non-eligible households. They, however, estimate only a composite
social interaction e¤ect. Unlike these papers, in this study, I disentangle the endogenous peer e¤ects from
the exogenous ones. From a policy perspective, being able to isolate the endogenous peer e¤ects the from
exogenous e¤ects is likely to be important since endogenous e¤ect is the source of a social multiplier
(Boucher et al., 2014, p. 91). This is the rst contribution of this paper to the existing literature on peer
e¤ects in consumption.
The second contribution of my work has to do with the instruments constructed for identication of the
endogenous peer e¤ects. More specically, the novelty of the dataset (i.e., the availability of information on
household specic idiosyncratic expenditure shocks) used in this paper allows me to construct instruments for
peer consumption which are credibly excluded from the regression equation in order to identify endogenous
peer e¤ects without having to assume zero exogenous peer e¤ects.6 This is a substantial improvement
over many prior papers in the peer e¤ects literature employing an IV strategy to estimate endogenous peer
e¤ects in absence of high dimensional social network data. Generally, these papers simply assume away all
5Of course, there is separate body of literature that looks at how relative consumption and income a¤ects subjective welfare
of households and individuals in low income countries (see for e.g. Fafchamps and Shilpi, 2008; Ravallion and Lokshin, 2010).
Also, in a recent paper Roychowdhury (2017), looks at the psychosocial impact of inequality on conspicuous consumption
using data from India. These papers, however, are not concerned with quantifying or evaluating endogenous peer e¤ects in
consumption.
6 In fact, being able to control for a host of exogenous peer e¤ects also means that the concern of omitted variable bias
emanating from group level unobservables (which may remain despite the inclusion of district xed e¤ects) gets considerably
reduced.
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exogenous peer e¤ects in the main equation predicting the outcome and use these as instruments for peer
outcome variable (e.g., Gaviria and Raphael, 2001; McVicar and Polanski, 2014). However, as noted by
Fletcher (2010), it is not very clear if any of their instruments are appropriately excluded from the main
equation.
The paper unfolds as follows. In section 2, I set out the theoretical model. Section 3 discusses the data.
Section 4 discusses the identication issues and presents the empirical strategy. The main results and results
of robustness checks are presented in Section 5. The last section concludes.
2 A Simple Model of Social Interactions in Consumption
In this section, I develop a theoretical framework of peer e¤ects in consumption to motivate my empirics. I
adjust a standard model of consumer choice with a social utility component that captures the satisfaction
that a household gets from status-seeking behavior. In other words, it is utility that a household obtains from
getting ahead of others in the peer group. My model predicts that a households consumption is positively
related with that of its peers.
Basic Setup. Suppose a nite set of households fi = 1; 2; :::;Mg is partitioned into non-overlapping social
groups indexed by r = 1; 2; :::; r. LetMr be the rth social group of size mr. I dene household is peer group
as all other members in its social group. Let Mi;r be household is group of peers of size mr   1. A peer
is any other household whose consumption decision and personal characteristics may a¤ect is consumption
decision.
Households in my framework live for one period and have a given endowment of income; let yi;r denote
household is income. Household i uses its income to nance its consumption ci;r and leave bequests bi;r
for its future generations which is motivated by joy-of-giving. Even though in a narrow sense bi;r captures
nancial bequests, it can be interpreted as any investment (e.g., human capital) from current income that
enhances the productive capacity of children (e.g., health, education).
Preferences. I assume households have common preferences given by the utility function
Ui;r = u1(ci;r; bi;r;	i;r) + v(ci;r   c i;r) (1)
where u(:) is a conventionalutility function; v(:) captures social utility or utility from social comparisons
which measures the utility attributable to the deviation of own consumption from average peer consumption
given by c i;r = 1mr 1
P
j2Mi;r cj;r. The component 	i;r introduces the exogenous heterogeneity that
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captures the di¤erences between households. Sources of such heterogeneity are household is demographic
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j;r, k = 1; 2; :::;K: I assume that the idiosyncratic preference shocks that a¤ect decisions of
household i (and which are a part of 	i;r) can be decomposed into two components as follows:
i;r = zi;r + i;r (2)
where zi;r denotes a J  1 vector of observed(or, reported) idiosyncratic shocks zji;r, j = 1; 2; :::; J , and
i;r denote the unobservedidiosyncratic shock. I will come back to this assumption later.
I assume that the social utility function v(:) measures utility due to status-seeking behavior or utility
from getting ahead of others. Specically, I assume v0(:) > 0 and v00(:) < 0: These assumptions have
been used by Corneo (2002) and Clark and Oswald (1998) among many others, and implies that people
enjoy surpassing others consumption, and that comparison utility is concave (i.e., diminishing marginal
comparison utility holds or higher is a households consumption relative to the mean, lesser is its increase in
utility due to increase in status). As noted by Clark and Oswald (1998, p. 137), ...individuals constantly
compare themselves to others. The most natural interpretation is that they feel in competition with human
beings like themselves, and enjoy a sense of well-being when they out-perform their peers, or obtain a sense
of failure and envy when they rank poorly besides those peers. Much of social psychology rests upon notions
of this kind.
Maximization Problem. The problem of household i is to choose ci;r and bi;r by maximizing
Ui;r = u(ci;r; bi;r;xi;r; zi;r;i;r; y i;r;x i;r) + v(ci;r   c i;r) (3)
subject to a income budget constraint given by:
ci;r + bi;r  yi;r; ci;r; bi;r  0 (4)
Solving the rst order conditions of the above maximization problem, one can obtain
ci;r = (c i;r; yi;r;xi;r; zi;r;i;r; y i;r;x i;r) (5)
which is the consumption best-response function of household i in peer reference group r.
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Comparative Static. In equation (5), my right hand side variable of interest is c i;r. Specically, I am
interested to nd how consumption of household i responds to a change in its average peer consumption,
which in the peer e¤ects literature is referred to as the endogenous peer e¤ect. To sign this comparative static
e¤ect in absence of any explicit functional form of the utility function, note that for an interior maximum
the following condition must hold:
u01(ci;r; yi;r  ci;r;xi;r; zi;r;i;r; y i;r;x i;r) u02(ci;r; yi;r  ci;r;xi;r; zi;r;i;r; y i;r;x i;r)+ v0(ci;r  c i;r) = 0
(6)
where u01 = @u=@ci;r and u
0
2 = @u=@(yi;r   ci;r):





u001(ci;r; yi;r   ci;r;xi;r; zi;r;ei;r; y i;r;x i;r) + u002(ci;r; yi;r   ci;r;xi;r; zi;r;ei;r; y i;r;x i;r)  v00(ci;r   c i;r)
(7)
The numerator on the right-hand side of equation (7) is negative. The denominator is also negative by




In other words, an increase in average consumption causes household i to increase its own consumption.
The focus of this paper is to test this prediction. To do so, I formulate an econometric model in Section
4 to estimate the consumption best-response function given by equation (5). The estimation of equation
(5) however faces several challenges. First, average peer consumption is endogenous due to simultaneity.
Second, there might be unobserved aggregate shocks that are correlated with average peer consumption and
possibly with other variables in equation (5) and/or there might be non-random sorting of households into
social groups both of which would bias the estimates of peer e¤ects. Nonetheless, I leave the discussion of
these issues for Section 4 and now I turn to describe my data.
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3 Data
3.1 The Indian Human Development Survey 2012
The Data. The Indian Human Development Survey (IHDS) 2012 is a nationally representative multitopic
household survey conducted by the National Council for Applied Economic Research (NCAER) in New Delhi
and University of Maryland (Desai et al., 2015). It was designed to complement existing Indian household
surveys by bringing together a wide range of topics in a single survey. This breadth permits analyses
of associations across a range of social and economic conditions. The sample was drawn using stratied
random sampling.
The IHDS 2012, conducted between November 2011 and October 2012, covers 42,152 households in 1420
villages and 1042 census-dened urban neighborhoods located throughout India.7 The survey covered all the
states and union territories of India except Andaman and Nicobar, and Lakshadweep. These two account
for less than 0.05 percent of Indias population. The data is publicly available from the Data Sharing
for Demographic Research program of the Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research
(ICPSR).8
The IHDS 2012 is based on two one-hour interviews with a knowledgeable informant in each household.
The interviews covered health, education, employment, economic status, marriage, fertility, gender relations
and social capital of the households. The survey instruments were translated into 13 Indian languages and
were administered by local interviewers. The main advantage of using the IHDS is that it includes many
questions that are not asked in the larger and more commonly used Indian household survey, the National
Sample Survey (NSS). In particular, detailed questions on income, consumption expenditure, and expenditure
shocks are asked in the IHDS 2012. It also has a broad array of demographic and family questions which
permits me to include a variety of control variables. Moreover, the survey provides the precise geographic
location of households (i.e., one can identify a households village or neighborhood from the survey). All
these features make the use of IHDS 2012 attractable for the present research.
Peer Group. Like most other household surveys, IHDS does not have precise social interactions data.
Consequently, I need to dene peer/reference groups of the households before carrying out my analysis.
As noted by Cojocaru (2014), in laboratory experiments, the relevant reference group is obvious in games
7According to the Indian National Census (2011a), the denition of urban area is as follows: (1) All places with a municipality,
corporation, cantonment board or notied town area committee, etc.; (2) All other places which satised the following criteria:
(i) A minimum population of 5,000; (ii) At least 75% of the male main working population engaged in non-agricultural pursuits;
and (iii) A density of population of at least 400 persons per sq. km. The urban neighborhoods are dened as per the Indian
Census. Each decade, the Census draws neighborhoods of approximately equal size (about 200 households) in all Indian towns
and cities (urban areas).
8http://www.icpsr.umich.edu/icpsrweb/DSDR/studies/36151
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involving two subjects, and most theories of other-regarding preferences in n-person games assume the
remaining (n 1) actors to form the relevant reference group (Fehr and Schmidt, 2006). It is much less clear
what the relevant reference groups are in the general population for purposes of social comparisons, and
there is little consensus in the literature on this issue. The social comparison theory proposed by Festinger
(1954) suggested that individuals seek to compare their abilities/opinions with others who are perceived to be
similar in relevant dimensions. Duesenberry (1949), in formulating the relative income hypothesis, took the
neighbors as the group against which relative status is assessed. Deaton (2001) also suggests that, in absence
of precise social interactions data, the most sensible reference group of households are those that live in the
immediate geographic location. Fafchamps and Shilpi (2008), in fact, suggest that in context of low income
countries immediate neighbors is likely to constitute a natural reference group.9 This is because social-
psychologists have shown that, when making relative consumption assessments, people compare themselves
with a peer group composed of people who started from the same conditions, e.g., those they grew up
with. Since in India social mobility at the household level is remarkably low (Munshi and Rosenzweig, 2009;
Munshi and Rosenzweig, 2016) meaning that most people live along people they grew up with, people
almost certainly compare themselves to their immediate geographical neighbors(Deaton, 2001, p. 21).
Due to these reasons, I assume that the villages (in rural areas) and neighborhoods (in urban areas),
which basically are small geographic units10 populated by households who are similar in many dimensions
and are exposed to similar geographic and institutional conditions, form the relevant social groups.11 The
peer group or the reference group of a household is, therefore, comprised of all other households in its village
or neighborhood. In the section on robustness checks, however, I consider various alternative denitions of
peer group to check the sensitivity of my baseline results.
3.2 Variables and Sample Summary Statistics
Outcome Variable. The aim of the paper is to examine social interactions in consumption. The key
outcome variable is, therefore, household consumption expenditure. There are fty-two consumption cate-
gories in the IHDS 2012 (see Table A1 in the Supplementary Appendix for a complete list of consumption
categories). Thirty of the consumption categories, which are frequently purchased items, use a thirty day
time frame while the other twenty-two use a three hundred and sixty ve day time frame. I convert all
9That, following the suggestions of Deaton (2001) and Fafchamps and Shilpi (2008), most empirical studies use geographic
limiters in dening reference groups has recently been noted by Bhuiyan (2017, p. 2). Cojocaru (2014) also provides a
detailed review of how reference groups are dened in non-experimental literature on social comparisons, and reaches a similar
conclusion.
10The average area of villages included in the IHDS is approximately 3.3 sq. miles. While the average area of urban
neighborhoods are not available from the survey, these are also likely to be reasonably small since, as mentioned previously, the
average number of households residing in a census-dened urban neighborhood is roughly 200.
11 Implicitly, the assumption here is that neighborhoods are urban counterparts of rural villages.
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expenditures to the annual time frame. The sum of the expenditure of households on all these consumption
categories form the household consumption expenditure.
Demographics. Estimation of the household consumption function given by equation (5) requires me
to control for household characteristics that includes household current income and other demographic
variables. Fortunately, unlike most other household surveys, IHDS 2012 has very good data on current
household income. The current income of households reported in the survey is the sum total (for each
household) of wages and salaries, non-farm business income, net agricultural income, remittances, property
and other income and public benets. Each of these incomes are in turn constructed from more than fty
di¤erent sources of income queried in the survey.12
The set of demographic variables can be classied into two categories: characteristics of household heads
and socioeconomic features of households. Characteristics of household heads include age, gender, marital
status, and literacy status (whether literate or not). Also a set of dummy variables indicating caste a¢ liation
of the household head are included: Brahmin, non-Brahmin forward caste, other backward caste (OBC),
Scheduled Castes (SC), Scheduled Tribes (ST) and others. The socioeconomic features of households that
are used as controls are: household size, number of years they have been living in their current village or
neighborhood, proportion of children, adolescents and adults in the household, binary variables indicating the
number of married household members and a binary variable indicating whether the geographical location
of the household is classied as urban or rural as per the Indian National Census (2011a).
Idiosyncratic Shocks. Additionally, I also need to control for idiosyncratic shocks that potentially might
impact household consumption expenditure. As noted before, IHDS 2012 has several questions on expendi-
ture shocks, i.e., events that have impacted householdsconsumption expenditure in the recent past. Most
of these events are likely to be unforeseen and hence might be considered random. This is an unique feature
of the IHDS 2012 compared to other similar household surveys. As I will show later, the availability of data
on expenditure shocks in the IHDS 2012 is extremely important for the present study not only because my
theoretical model requires me to control for idiosyncratic shocks, but also because my identication strategy
(which I shall discuss later) crucially hinges on being able to nd data on these. My vector of observable
idiosyncratic household specic consumption shocks consist of the following events that have been reported
by the knowledgeable informant of the households as to have impacted their consumption expenditure: death
of a household member, loss of job in the household, incident of theft and incident of break-in. Here, I take
care to include only those shocks that are specic to any given household and are not correlated with the
12Although the IHDS takes considerable care in designing a questionnaire that enumerates several sources of income, mea-
surement errors in income cannot be ruled out. I address this issue further in the section on robustness checks.
10
occurrence of the same shock in other households.13
Analytic Sample. My estimation sample consists of 40,980 households from 1,411 rural villages and 1,039
urban neighborhoods located across 375 districts: these are households in the IHDS 2012 where I have
individual level information for household heads and for which the household head is above 18 years of
age, household current income is more than zero but less than Rs. 1,000,000 (equivalent to $15,385), total
consumption expenditure is more than zero, information on other household characteristics is non-missing
and nally the household lives in a village or neighborhood with not less than three (sampled) members.
Table 1 presents the description and summary statistics of all the variables used in this study.
[INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE]
4 Empirics
4.1 Econometric Model
Guided by the consumption best-response function presented in equation (5), I assume that my baseline
econometric model is given by




 i;r + y i;r + z
0
i;r+ i;r (9)
where all the variables are dened in section 2. The coe¢ cient  captures the endogenous peer e¤ect which
measures the e¤ect of average peer consumption on households own consumption. The exogenous peer
e¤ects or contextual e¤ects are captured by  and . These measure the impact of peer characteristics
and peer income on household consumption. The household e¤ects, or the impact of own income and own
characteristics, are captured by  and $. Finally,  measures the e¤ect of idiosyncratic shocks that a
household faces on its own consumption. The coe¢ cient of interest in equation (9) is . If households
exhibit status-seeking behavior, I should obtain  > 0.
13By denition idiosyncratic shocks are di¤erent from community shocks. While community shocks generally a¤ect most or
all members of the households within a particular community, idiosyncratic shock hits only a few of them. In other words, while
the proportion of households who are likely to be hit by a community level shock is close to 1, this gure is likely to be much
smaller for idiosyncratic shocks. My sample reveals that, on an average, the proportion of households in a village/neighborhood
in which there is a death is 0.19, the proportion of households that su¤er a job-loss is 0.03, the proportion of households that
report an incident of theft is 0.04, and the proportion of household that report an incident of break-in is 0.02. This is in line
with the notion of idiosyncratic shocks
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4.2 Identication Issues
There are two main challenges in identifying and estimating peer e¤ects based on my basic empirical speci-
cation given by equation (9). Firstly, since household is consumption a¤ects its peersmean consumption
and vice versa, one cannot distinguish if a group members action is the cause or the e¤ect of peersinu-
ence. This in turn will imply that  is subject to endogeneity bias. Manski (1993) labeled this the reection
problem.
Secondly, even though I have a comprehensive vector of group level controls (i.e., peer characteristics),
there might still be certain unobservable environmental attributes that are specic to social groups and/or
common to all members of a particular group. That is, the unobserved error term might be of the following
form:
i;r = r + "i;r, (10)
where r is the vector of group specic unobserved characteristics common to all group members (e.g.,
same motivation towards consumption or similar credit constraints), and "i;rs are innovations. It is evident
that rs are correlated with mean peer consumption expenditure. In fact, the village/neighborhood level
unobserved e¤ects may be also correlated with household characteristics, and peer characteristics. Econo-
metrically, this would imply existence of a non-zero correlation between the group unobservables r and one
or more regressors in equation (9). If there are such unobserved heterogeneity across social groups, then
estimates of peer e¤ects will be biased.
Additionally, the problem of correlated unobservables could arise if households self-select into social
groups with specic objectives (Falk and Knell, 2004). One way of doing this is typically via migration
or residential relocation (Stark and Taylor, 1991). For instance, a poor household living in a prosperous
neighborhood, to reduce its feeling of relative deprivation, might want to relocate to a less prosperous
neighborhood. Frequently there is such positive selection in which similarpeople join or are assigned to
the same group (Sacerdote, 2011). This non-random sorting potentially implies that unobserved households
characteristics are correlated with the characteristics of the group which could cause substantial upward bias
in the estimated magnitude of the endogenous and contextual peer e¤ects. However, this is unlikely to be a
cause of concern in my case, given that the spatial mobility at the household level is extremely low in India
(Munshi and Rosenzweig, 2009; Munshi and Rosenzweig, 2016). In fact, the data that I use in this paper
also shows that around 97% of the sampled households have been living in the same place for more than 10
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years, while 77% report to have been living in the same place forever.1415
4.3 Empirical Strategy
To identify endogenous peer e¤ects, I implement an approach based on IV/xed e¤ects. My IV strategy,
in essence, is similar to the method of spatial IVused widely in empirical spatial literature (see Gibbons
and Overman (2012) and Gibbons et al. (2015) for an overview). Not only does this strategy o¤ers the
advantage of computation ease, IV estimation remains consistent even in the presence of spatially correlated
error terms (Kelejian and Prucha, 1998; Brueckner, 2003). In addition, I try to address the potential problem
of unobserved heterogeneity across social groups that is not taken care by my IV strategy by including
district xed e¤ects.
IV Strategy. I begin by describing my IV strategy. To start with, I assume that village/neighborhood
unobserved e¤ects (if present) are uncorrelated with household characteristics and observable shocks. I shall
relax this assumption later.
To see how my approach works, I express my baseline model given by equation (9) in matrix notations. For
expository purposes, I assume that own income and peer income do not a¤ect consumption (i.e.,  =  = 0).
Also assume that households have unique characteristics and face unique observable idiosyncratic shocks (i.
e., K = J = 1). Recall that in my framework, I have assumed that households are a¤ected by all other
households in their social group and by none outside it. This means that the observed social interactions
can be modeled as an M M block-diagonal matrix G specied as









; r = 1; 2; ::; r (12)
where M denotes total number of households, r is the number of social groups, mr is the group size of group
r, mr is the mr-dimensional vector of ones, and Imr is the mr-dimensional identity matrix. Thus equation
(9) can be rewritten in matrix form as follows:
14 In the Supplementary Appendix, I exclude the households who report to have migrated to their current village/neighborhood
in the last ten years, and re-estimate the baseline regression model to check the sensitivity of my baseline results. I repeat the
same exercise also by excluding the households who have been living in their current village/neighborhood for less than twenty
years.
15 It is worth noting however that although household level migration between villages/neighborhoods is rare, households
often send out individuals/migrants for work who send remittances back home. I explore this issue in more detail in the section
of robustness checks.
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Cr = mr + GrCr +Xr$ + GrXr + Zr+ r; E(rjXr;Zr;Gr) = 0 (13)
where Cr, Xr and Zr are mr  1 vectors of consumption, household characteristics and idiosyncratic shocks
respectively, and r is the vector of the composite error term mrr + "r. Note that equation (13) is similar
to a spatial autoregressive (SAR) model (e.g., Cli¤ and Ord, 1981).
Concatenating 3quation (13) over all groups yields
C = + GC+X$ + GX+ Z+  (14)
where C (respectively ; X and Z) is obtained by stacking vectors Cr (respectively mr ; Xr and Zr) for
r = 1; 2; :::; ; r. Assuming  < 1; I  G is invertible. I can, thus, write equation (14) as:
C =  (I  G) 1 +(I  G) 1 (X$ + GX)+ (I  G) 1 Z+ (I  G) 1  (15)
Note that since (I  G) 1 =
1X
k=0
kGk, I can rewrite equation (15) as













Further, notice that from equation (16) the expected mean peer consumption can be written as:
E[GC jX;Z] ==(1  )+GZ+
1X
k=0




This implies that one can use GZ to instrument for GC.16 In other words, average peer observable
idiosyncratic shocks serve as valid instruments for average peer consumption. Note that my IV strategy
exploits the fact that in my theoretical model, the idiosyncratic shocks are assumed to be household specic
and that they do not contain any information about the consumption of other households, even those located
in the same village/neighborhood. As argued by Helmers and Patnam (2014, p. 95), this is a credible
assumption given the idiosyncratic nature of the shocks. Since this assumption implies that average peer
idiosyncratic shocks a¤ect average peer consumption and that average peer idiosyncratic shocks have no direct
impact on householdsown consumption (other than through peer consumption), these could potentially be
used as instruments for average peer consumption. My rst stage regression, therefore, becomes:
16 In principle, the higher order spatial lags of Z and X G2Z;G3Z,...., G2X;G3X; ::: can also be used instruments along
with GZ. However, as noted by Gibbons and Overman (2012), the higher order lags do not work well as instruments in practice
and gives rise to weak instruments/identication problem. This is because there is little independent variation (and hence
little additional information) in the higher order spatial lags of Z and X, conditional on GZ and GX.
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In equation (18), z0 i;r denotes the vector of average observable peer idiosyncratic shocks where the
idiosyncratic shocks are chosen from the events reported by the knowledgeable informant of the households
in 2012 IHDS to have had a¤ected their consumption expenditure.
Fixed E¤ects. The IV strategy described above is su¢ cient to produce consistent parameter estimates of my
baseline econometric model under the null hypothesis of no correlated e¤ects (i.e., r = 0) or when there are
group specic unobserved traits correlated with only consumption expenditure of the households (assuming
that the IVs are valid). But what happens if village or neighborhood level unobservables are allowed to be
correlated with householdsown characteristics? Unfortunately, the above described IV strategy may not
produce consistent estimates of the endogenous peer e¤ect when there are such correlations.17
To address this concern, I incorporate a full set of district xed e¤ects. Districts, which represent
administrative divisions of an Indian state, are clusters of several villages/neighborhoods located in the same
geographical area.18 The logic behind including the district xed e¤ects is that these would capture the
unobserved heterogeneity at the level of districts. Since villages/neighborhoods within a particular district
are likely to be similar,19 the incorporation of the district xed e¤ects along with the fact that I have a
comprehensive vector of group level controls (peer characteristics) is likely to be su¢ cient for the above
discussed IV strategy to produce consistent parameter estimates.20 The assumption is that, given that I
have a comprehensive vector of group level attributes (i.e., contextual e¤ects) in my baseline econometric
equation, the remaining group-level heterogeneity (if any) does not vary across villages/neighborhoods within
a district.
Validity of Identication Strategy. While in principle the above described IV/xed e¤ects strategy
allows me to consistently estimate the parameters of the baseline econometric model given by equation
(9), in practice the success of it depends on whether the set of instruments, z i;r, constructed using the
expenditure shocks chosen from IHDS 2012 satisfy two crucial conditions. First, a testable condition is that
17To see this, suppose that income of every household is correlated with unobserved village/neighborhood level characteristics
as well as with household specic idiosyncratic shocks. This means average peer income will be correlated with group level unob-
servables as well as with average observed peer shocks. This, in turn, is likely to imply that average observed peer idiosyncratic
shocks will be correlated with group level unobservables which violates the exogeneity requirement of the instrument.
18 In India, as of 2014, there are 29 states and, on an average, there are 23 districts in each state. The average area of a
district is 1775 sq. miles.
19 In India, districts are divided on the basis of ethical, cultural and social interaction rather on the basis of easiness or
prosperity (Indian National Census, 2011b). As such, villages/neighborhoods within a particular district are likely to be similar
along observable and unobservable ethical and cultural dimensions.
20My identication strategy ensures that it is not the price e¤ect that is driving my result. This is because my IV strat-
egy will produce consistent parameter estimates even when there are unobserved di¤erences in prices of goods across vil-
lages/neighborhoods. In fact, if prices are the only omitted village/neighborhood level characteristics, I do not even need to use
district xed e¤ects since prices, presumably, are uncorrelated with the demographic characteristics (and shocks) of households.
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average peer idiosyncratic shocks must be correlated with average peer consumption (which should hold as
long as the shocks a¤ect household consumption expenditure). Second, the idiosyncratic shocks hitting the
peers of household i should a¤ect the households own consumption only indirectly through their impact
on its peers consumption. This is tantamount to saying that average peer idiosyncratic shocks must be
uncorrelated with the error term. This second criterion is an untestable maintained assumption.
To examine whether the chosen shocks satisfy the rst condition, I carry out the Kleibergen-Paap rk
LM test (2006). The LM test seeks to test whether that the excluded instruments are correlated with the
endogenous regressors. The null hypothesis of this test is that the minimum canonical correlation between
the endogenous variables and the instruments is not statistically di¤erent from zero. Rejection of the null
hypothesis indicates that the model is identied. Further, since IV estimates based on weakinstruments are
biased towards OLS estimates (Bound et al., 1995; Staiger and Stock, 1997; Stock et al., 2002) I report the
F-statistic from the rst stage regressions which is the test to examine strength of instruments. According to
Staiger and Stock (1997) and Stock and Yogo (2005), an F-statistic value of 10 (or higher) implies rejection
of the null hypothesis of weak instruments.
While, as noted above, it is in general not possible to test whether the instruments are uncorrelated with
the error term, I carry out balancing tests (Bifulco et al., 2011; Lavy and Schlosser, 2011) to assess the
likelihood of my instruments being uncorrelated with the unobserved error term. This test seeks to assess
the correlation between the instruments and unobserved error term based on the correlation between the
instruments and observed characteristics of households.21 If the instruments are found to be uncorrelated
with observable household characteristics related to consumption (more than what would be expected by
chance), they may also be uncorrelated with the unobservable factors related to consumption (that are in
the error term), following the logic of Altonji et al. (2005). As argued by Fletcher (2010, 2012, 2015), this
is suggestive, but not conclusive, that the instruments can be treated as plausibly exogenous (or random
shocks).
Further, since my model is over identied, I carry out the Hansen J test (1982), which is an overiden-
tication test designed to examine the validity of the instruments (in terms of satisfying the exogeneity
restriction). This test seeks to obtain multiple estimates of the treatment e¤ect (which in the present case
are the endogenous peer e¤ect) based on various subsets of the instrumental variables and tests whether
the obtained treatment e¤ects are same. If all instruments are uncorrelated with the error term, all subsets
should (asymptotically) return the same estimate of the treatment e¤ect. The joint null hypothesis of this
test is that the instruments are valid instruments (i.e., uncorrelated with the error term) and that the ex-
21 I perform this test by regressing householdsown background characteristics (income, household size, etc.) on peer shocks
(instruments) controlling for district xed e¤ects, plus own shocks, and peer background characteristics.
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cluded instruments are correctly excluded from the estimating equation. A rejection of the null hypothesis
casts doubt on the validity of the instruments. However, failure to reject the null does not necessarily mean
that the exclusion restriction holds.
Model Estimation. I estimate my baseline model by the technique of Generalized Method of Moments
(GMM). Since my model is overidentied, I report the two-step GMM estimates or optimal GMM estimates,
which is the most e¢ cient GMM estimator for overidentied models with heteroscedastic errors of unknown
form (for a detailed overview of the two-step GMM see Cameron and Trivedi, 2005 and Baum et al., 2007).
4.4 Threats to Identication
As noted previously, both the balancing tests as well as the Hansen J test provide only suggestive evi-
dence that the IV/xed e¤ects approach is valid. In practice, however, one can think of several situations
where my identication strategy might not yield consistent estimates of the endogenous peer e¤ect. First,
as discussed above, the district xed e¤ects would take care of the group level omitted variable bias if vil-
lages/neighborhoods within a district do not di¤er along unobservable ways. If, even after conditioning
on the contextual e¤ects, villages/neighborhoods within a district di¤er along unobservable ways, then the
IV/district xed e¤ects-based strategy would not be su¢ cient to address the endogeneity due to group level
unobservables.
Second, the instruments used in this study are created based upon idiosyncratic shocks that are all
necessarily negativeand accidentalin nature. Thus, the instruments are exploiting the variation in average
peer consumptions related to this particular type of shock. Whether the results would hold if instead I had
considered other types of shocks (e.g. positive idiosyncratic shocks like winning a lottery) is not readily
apparent.
Third, since the peer idiosyncratic shocks used to construct the instruments are all negative, it may
be the case that they are correlated with a households feeling of reciprocity or empathy which I am not
able to control for in the baseline model. For instance, a household hears that its relevant neighbor just
met with an accident, and this may cause that household to be more empathetic or augments its feelings of
reciprocity. This may in turn cause it to exhibit less of a status-seeking behavior. If this is the case, not
controlling for such social feelings will cause my instruments to be correlated with the error term. However,
it is extremely di¢ cult to nd data on variables that would capture social attitudes, feelings and emotions
from non-experimental household surveys (especially those carried out in developing countries) that would
allow me to perfectly control for these e¤ects.
Finally, the social interaction structure considered in this paper may not be very realistic. For instance,
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instead of being equally a¤ected by all others in the same village/neighborhood, a household may be inu-
enced more signicantly by some people in the village/neighborhood, especially by its friends. On the other
hand, a household that does not send out migrants for work, might not be a¤ected at all by households in
its village/neighborhood that does so. This is because the households that send out migrants for work might
be very di¤erent in their wealth levels compared to the households that do not.
In the section of robustness checks, I try to address some of these limitations in more detail and check the




OLS Results. Table 2 reports the naive OLS results. These estimates provide a useful benchmark with
which to compare the results from the IV method. Column (1) regresses household consumption on average
peer consumption, household income, household characteristics and household specic idiosyncratic shocks.
Column (2) extends the set of regressors to include contextual e¤ects. Column (3) adds district xed e¤ects.
Note that, I report only the point estimates of endogenous peer e¤ect for every specication. Full results are
relegated to the Supplementary Appendix due to space constraints (see Table A2).
[INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE]
Across all specications, I nd a strong association between own and peer consumption with the coe¢ cient
of average peer consumption varying between 0.2 and 0.6. Moreover all the coe¢ cients are statistically
signicant at 1% level of signicance. These estimates are not, however, what I would wish to take seriously,
given the identication issues discussed above, which OLS fails to resolve.
IV Estimates. Before presenting results using instrumental variables, I present the results from the balanc-
ing tests (Bifulco et al., 2011; Lavy and Schlosser, 2011) to show that the preferred instrumental variables are
plausibly exogenous. In Table 3, I show that the instrumental variables are conditionally uncorrelated with
all household characteristics. This evidence is suggestive, but not conclusive, that the instruments may also
be uncorrelated with unobservable factors related to household consumption (which are in the error term),
following the logic of Altonji et al. (2005), which is a maintained untestable assumption for the analysis to
be valid. Overall, these results add condence that the instruments are quasi-random within districts.
[INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE]
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The IV results are reported in Table 4. As in the case of OLS, I report only the estimates of endogenous
peer e¤ects for each specication. Full IV results (including the rst stage) are presented in Table A3 in the
Supplementary Appendix.
I start by describing the performance of IV/xed e¤ect models in terms of the diagnostic tests. First,
notice that all the specications perform remarkably well in terms of the Hansen (1982) overidentication test,
Kleibergen-Paap (2006) rk LM test for underidentication as well as the F-test for excluded instruments to
assess the strength of the instruments. Specically, for all the specications, based on the Hansen J statistic,
I am strongly unable to reject the joint null hypothesis that the instruments are uncorrelated with the error
term and that the excluded instruments are correctly excluded from the estimated equation. Next, across
all the specications reported, the estimated Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistic allows me to clearly reject the
null hypothesis that the instruments are uncorrelated with the endogenous regressors and that the model
is not identied. Finally, the rst stage F-statistic for excluded instruments lies well above 10 across all
the specications in each panel, which clearly indicates that none of the specications su¤er from the weak
instrument problem.22
[INSERT TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE]
Next, I turn to the actual two-step GMM estimates of the endogenous peer e¤ects in consumption.
Strikingly, across all specications, I nd strong evidence of endogenous peer e¤ects in consumption. This is
in line with the OLS results. Specically, column (1) shows that the estimated impact of peersconsumption
on own consumption based on the regression that neither includes contextual e¤ects nor district xed e¤ects
is 0.78 (s.e. = 0.147). Column (2) shows that the estimated impact of endogenous peer e¤ects based on
the regression that adds contextual e¤ects (but not district xed e¤ects) to the set of regressors is 0.85 (s.e.
= 0.128). Both these coe¢ cients are also statistically signicant at 1% level of signicance. These results
indicate that under the null hypothesis of no correlated unobservables, there is clear evidence of strong
endogenous peer e¤ects in consumption. However, if there are village/neighborhood level unobservables
correlated with household characteristics and/or household specic idiosyncratic shocks, then these estimates
are not consistent.
22The rst stage IV results reported in Table A3 in the Supplementary Appendix also show that the individual instruments
(peer idiosyncratic shocks) are signicantly correlated with the endogenous variable (peer consumption expenditure). That, for
my preferred specication (column 5), these correlations are positive conditional on the fact the peer income is held constant
in the rst stage  is not surprising: a death in the household in India is followed by a huge social ceremony that entails a
huge expenditure. Similarly, a theft or breakin may cause households to replace the stolen goods or enhance the security of
their homes  both of which are likely to cause expenditure to rise. Finally, a job loss in the household may lead to increase
in consumption expenditure due to at least two reasons. First, a job loss might be followed by the person losing job to enroll
in a job-training program which might increase total household expenditure. Second, there is ample evidence that suggests
that job loss is associated with health compromising behaviors like alcohol abuse, which might also drive up total household
expenditure.
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To account for the potential problem of correlated unobservables, I report the results of my preferred
specication reported in column (3) which regresses own consumption on average peer consumption con-
trolling for own income, own characteristics, own idiosyncratic shocks, average peer income, average peer
characteristics and district xed e¤ects. I nd the estimate of endogenous peer e¤ect to be 0.69 (s.e. =
0.223) which is statistically signicant at 1% level of signicance. This means that an increase in (mean)
peer consumption expenditure by 1 Indian Rupee causes households to increase their own consumption ex-
penditure by roughly 0.7 Indian Rupee, on average. In terms of standard deviations, this translates into a
0.34 standard deviations (roughly 37,637 Indian Rupees/year) increase in own consumption in response to
a one standard deviation (roughly 54,546 Indian Rupees/year) increase in peer consumption. Note that this
e¤ect is not only large in absolute terms but is in fact exactly equal to the impact of an equal increase (in
terms of standard deviation) in own income. Overall, my results indicate the presence of strong peer e¤ects
in consumption.
To my knowledge, the only other study that seeks to estimate peer e¤ects in aggregate consumption is
that by De Giorgi et al. (2016). Using network data from Denmark they nd that the elasticity of own
consumption with respect to peers consumption is 0.3. How do my results compare to the ndings of De
Giorgi et al. (2016)? To answer this question, I estimate a double log version of my baseline specication
(i.e., I use both households own consumption and average peer consumption in logs). My IV strategy delivers
an estimate of the elasticity of roughly 0.5 (s.e. = 0.124).23 This indicates that not only there are substantial
peer e¤ects in consumption in a low income country, but these e¤ects are larger than those obtained for high
income countries.
Social Multiplier. Peer e¤ects potentially imply that small exogenous shock at the household level is
magnied through the social interactions process to deliver larger aggregate level social e¤ects. Glaeser and
Scheinkman (2001) and Glaeser et al. (2003) dene the social multiplier as the ratio of the household e¤ect
from an exogenous shock to the aggregate e¤ect from the same shock. As argued by Sacerdote (2011), social
multiplier is useful because it delivers the parameter of direct interest to policy makers, namely if a policy
can exogenously induce one additional person to take action A, how many total people will take action A in
equilibrium? In the Supplementary Appendix, I show that the magnitude of the social multiplier based on
my baseline regression equation (9) is 1=(1   ). Thus, based on my preferred specication (i.e.,   0:7)
the value of the social multiplier in the present work is roughly equal to 3. This means that the equilibrium
response to a shock that induces an exogenous variation in mean household consumption spending is about
3 times the initial average response.
23Results of this specication are not reported, but are available from the author on request.
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Heterogeneity Analysis. To check for heterogeneity in endogenous peer e¤ects, I report results of sub-
sample analysis in Table 5. Specically, I cut the sample along three dimensions: household poverty status,
caste a¢ liation, and area of residence.
[INSERT TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE]
It turns out that the point estimates of the endogenous peer e¤ect is higher for the non-poor households
compared to the households who fall below the poverty line, for the high caste households compared to the
low caste ones, as well as for the households living in urban areas compared to the rural households. Note,
however, the di¤erence in endogenous peer e¤ect between the subsamples is statistically signicant only for
the rst case, and not for the second or the third cases. This perhaps indicates that those households who
are just trying to survive perhaps do not look at what others consume. Once households cross a minimum
economic threshold they start looking at their peers consumption and consume some goods accordingly.24
This implies that the problem of under-saving or over-borrowing owing to status-seeking consumption be-
havior is likely to be more salient for the non-poor households compared to households who are o¢ cially
classied as poor.
5.2 Robustness Checks
In this section, I conduct various robustness checks to assess the robustness of my estimates to di¤erent sorts
of biases.
Falsication Test. I begin by providing a falsication test. All my results indicate the presence of a positive
and signicant endogenous peer e¤ects in consumption of a household where peer groups are assumed to
comprise of all other people living in the same village or neighborhood. I now show that such a result is not
obtained from considering just any random peer group. In essence, I validate the strength and signicance
of the actual observed peer group by ruling out the presence of peer e¤ects within randomly generated peer
groups. Put di¤erently, this is a test for my identifying assumption that geographical proximity mediates
peer e¤ects.
To test this, I randomly assign peers to each household from across the entire sample. The total number of
peers assigned to each household is equal the average size of peer groups, which is equal to 16. Subsequently, I
estimate equation (9) controlling for district xed e¤ect. I repeat this exercise 100 times, each time randomly
assigning peers to every household.
24Whether the di¤erences in endogenous peer e¤ects across subsamples are statistically signicant or not is judged based on
the results of the z-test (Paternoster et al., 1998). A value of z-statistic below 2 generally implies that the di¤erence between
the estimated endogenous peer e¤ects is not statistically signicant.
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[INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE]
The histogram in Figure 1 shows the empirical distribution of t-statistics corresponding to the endogenous
peer e¤ects obtained from 100 replications. The mean t-statistic is 1.06. This means that I cannot reject
the null hypothesis that endogenous peer e¤ect is equal to zero. Moreover, the majority of point estimates
of endogenous peer e¤ects are statistically insignicant as indicated by the distribution of the t-statistics.
Specically, for peer e¤ects associated with each of the 100 iterations, I nd that I am unable to reject the
null that the coe¢ cient (point estimate) is equal to zero for 89 coe¢ cients out of 100. This shows that
repeated experiments with di¤erent randomized social groups produce statistically insignicant endogenous
peer e¤ects on average. Hence, this exercise lends support to my approach of constructing peer groups based
on geographical proximity.
Inclusion of controls for covariate shocks. Despite having a comprehensive set of group level controls,
as well as district xed e¤ects in my preferred specication of the baseline regression model given by equation
(9), there might still be some omitted factors that vary between groups within districts. If this is the case,
the estimates of the endogenous peer e¤ects may not be consistent. To examine this, I augment my set of
regressors by including three important covariate (community) shocks, namely, crop failure, droughts/oods
and conict. By denition, covariate shocks a¤ect almost all households within a neighborhood/village. As
such, it would be interesting to check the sensitivity of my baseline results to inclusion of these group level
shocks.
The results are reported in columns (1) - (3) of Table 6. I nd that inclusion of the covariate shocks
makes almost no di¤erence to the estimates of the endogenous peer e¤ects.25 This suggests that group level
shocks are unlikely to be responsible for the co-movement in household consumption within peer groups
reported in my baseline estimation.
[INSERT TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE]
Inclusion of correlates of social emotions as controls. In this paper, I identify the endogenous peer
e¤ects by exploiting the variation in average peer idiosyncratic shocks. However, since the idiosyncratic
shocks on which I have data are all negative, it may be the case that they are correlated with an individuals
feeling of reciprocity or empathy which I do not control for in the baseline model. As noted previously, a
household might hear that its relevant neighbors just met with an accident. It may cause that household
25 In fact, the coe¢ cient of the covariate shocks themselves turn out to be statistically insignicant. This means that the
covariate shocks, conditional on the other household and group level regressors and district xed e¤ects, have no impact on
householdsown consumption expenditure.
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to be more empathetic or augment its feelings of reciprocity, and this causes it to exhibit less status-
seeking behavior. If this is the case, not controlling for such social feelings will cause my instruments to
be correlated with the error term of the baseline regression model. However, it is extremely di¢ cult to
nd data on variables that would capture social attitudes, feelings and emotions from non-experimental
household surveys (especially those carried out in developing countries) that would allow me to perfectly
control for these e¤ects. However, since I believe this issue is important, I explore the dataset that I use,
and also the literature on behavioral issues like empathy and reciprocity to see if I could examine this issue
in more detail.
It turns out that according to several studies in the behavioral sciences, feelings of reciprocity and em-
pathy are strongly correlated with prosocial behavior in general (see Telle and Pster, 2015 for a recent
review of the literature on this topic). Now, one way in which prosocial behavior is displayed is of course via
participation in social groups/festivals and engaging in informal social networks. This implies that a measure
of prosocial behavior is likely to be participation of individuals in social groups/festivals, youth clubs and
sports groups. Thus, there is likely to exist a strong correlation between feelings of empathy and reciprocity
and participation in social groups/festivals. Therefore, including variables capturing an individuals partici-
pation in social groups/festivals as well as in sports groups and informal clubs might serve as useful controls
for feelings of empathy/reciprocity. Thankfully, IHDS has information on individualsparticipation in social
groups/festivals and whether they belong to any sports groups or youth clubs. Specically, the IHDS asks
the household heads: (1) Does anybody in the household belong to a social group or festival society? (2)
Does anybody in the household belong to a youth club, sports group or reading room? I include these
binary variables and re-estimate my baseline model to check the sensitivity of my results to the inclusion of
proxies for feelings of reciprocity/empathy. Results are reported in columns (4) and (5) of Table 6. It turns
out that the point estimate of my endogenous peer e¤ect remains almost unchanged. Thus, although this is
a crude method to control for feelings or emotions of reciprocity/ empathy, nonetheless, this provides some
evidence that my results are not driven by omitted variables like social emotions or feelings of empathy.
Local Public Goods. One concern regarding the instruments is that if the instruments are correlated with
average peer income, and average peer income is related to a households consumption via the public goods
(assuming there is some substitutability between public and private good) and this is not accounted for,
then the instruments would be correlated with the error term. One way to examine this problem is perhaps
to include some direct measure(s) of public goods at the local level as additional regressors in the baseline
model, and test the sensitivity of the baseline results to the inclusion of these variables. If the estimates of
the endogenous peer e¤ects do not change signicantly after the inclusion of the public good variables, it
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is unlikely to be the case that the instruments are correlated to the error term due to the non-inclusion of
measures of local public good provision in the baseline analysis.
To examine this issue, I look for variables in the IHDS that may be potentially used as measures of local
public goods. IHDS has a separate village level survey, which, fortunately, has information on government
schools and government health facilities (hospitals, clinics, etc.) in villages, which potentially might be
used as measures of local public goods (given that public schools and public health facilities are generally
considered as important public goods). In particular, IHDS has information on whether there are such
public facilities in the villages, as well as the number of government schools and number of government
hospitals, clinics, etc. I re-estimate my baseline model including these variables as controls for local public
goods. If average village income is correlated with these public goods, then explicitly controlling for these
will not cause my instruments to be correlated with the error term (even if the instruments are correlated
with average village income). However, note that IHDS has information at the local level only for rural
areas (i.e. villages) and not urban areas (i.e., the local survey questionnaire is administered only in rural
areas). In other words, I do not have information about local public good provision for urban areas. As such,
my sensitivity analysis is restricted only to the rural sample.26 I estimate two specications. In the rst
specication, I include village level controls for number of government primary schools, number of government
middle schools, number of government secondary schools, number of government higher secondary schools,
and number of government colleges. In the second, I control for number of health subcenters, number of
government dispensaries, number of primary health centers, and number of community health centers. For
both the specications, I nd that the results, reported in Table 6 (columns (6) and (7)), are similar to my
baseline results. Thus, at least, for the rural sample I can conclude that public goods are not a source of
omitted variable bias in the baseline analysis.
Alternative Peer Reference Group. In my baseline analysis, I assume that a households reference
group consists of all other households in its village/neighborhood. However, one concern could be that I
might care only about somepeople (and not about everyone) in my village/neighborhood. In other words,
it might be useful to dene reference groups in one or two additional dimensions, for example by caste and by
whether the household has sent out any migrants who send remittances back home, and check the sensitivity
of my results. I am particularly interested in dening peer groups based on caste because the importance of
the caste system as a regulator of social interactions in India has been highlighted in various studies (e.g.,
Munshi, 2016). This could potentially imply that self-identication is stronger among households of the same
caste living in the same region than among households living in the same region but belonging to di¤erent
26This is the best I could do to address this concern, given the available data.
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castes. On the other hand, households who regularly send out migrants who send remittances back home
can be very di¤erent in their wealth levels and hence may not serve as a reference peer group for those who
do not send out migrants.
[INSERT TABLE 7 ABOUT HERE]
One problem in dening reference groups in terms of multiple dimensions in the present case, given that
average number of households sampled from villages/neighborhoods is roughly 20, is that I am likely to
end up with many households having no other households in their reference group. As I would need to
exclude such households, this will reduce the size of my analytical sample. Nonetheless, I re-estimate my
baseline econometric model using three alternative denitions of reference groups: (1) village/neighborhood
of residence and caste (i.e. households in the same village and same caste group form a peer reference
group), and (2) village of residence and migrant status (i.e., households within a village who have not sent
out migrants for work form a peer reference group, whereas households within a village who have sent out
migrants form a di¤erent peer group), and (3) village of residence, caste, and migrant status. Results are
reported in Table 7. Reassuringly, the estimates of endogenous peer e¤ect from all the three specications
remains similar to that obtained from the baseline regression model.
5.3 Additional Robustness Checks and Disaggregate Analysis
In addition to the falsication test and the robustness checks presented above, I conduct several other
robustness checks. First, I run my baseline regressions transforming consumption expenditure and income
in logarithms. Second, I instrument household income by literacy status of the father of the household
head (or father of household heads husband). Third, I present IV results of additional specications using
di¤erent subsets of the vector of peer idiosyncratic shocks as instruments in the rst stage and including the
remaining peer shocks as covariates in the second stage. Fourth, I examine whether the typeof idiosyncratic
shock hitting the household matters. Fifth, I estimate my baseline regression equation based on a sample
that excludes households who have migrated to their current area of residence relatively recently. Sixth, I
create a household level price index based on prices of nontradable goods. Then I use this price index as an
additional control in my regression model. Also, I re-estimate my baseline regression model by deating total
consumption expenditure using this price index. Seventh, I exclude those households who regularly send
out migrants from my analytical sample, as these households might come from a di¤erent data generating
process (DGP). Finally, I use sampling weights and re-estimate my baseline regression model. My baseline
results remain robust throughout these exercises.
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Additionally, I carry out a disaggregate analysis and nd that the increase in own consumption expen-
diture due to endogenous peer e¤ect is driven by an increase in own expenditure on temptation goods and
food. Detailed results of all these additional robustness checks and the disaggregate analysis can be found
in the Supplementary Appendix.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, I examine whether consumption of householdspeers a¤ect their own consumption in a less
developed country. I dene a households peer group as other households living in its village/neighborhood.
In assessing the inuences of peers in this context, there are two key empirical challenges including shared
group-level unobservables, and simultaneity of peer inuences. I address these issues by using an instru-
mental variables/xed e¤ects approach that compares households in the same district but di¤erent vil-
lages/neighborhoods who are thus exposed to di¤erent sets of peers. In particular, I use plausibly exogenous
variation in idiosyncratic expenditure shocks faced by peers as instruments for peersconsumption expen-
diture. Preferred specication suggests that a 1 Indian Rupee increase in consumption expenditure of a
households peers causes the households own consumption expenditure to increase by 0.7 Indian Rupee
which translates into a social multiplier of about 3. This means that the equilibrium response to a shock
that induces an exogenous variation in mean household consumption spending is about 3 times the initial
average response. Falsication tests and robustness checks support the validity of the results.
While this paper is able to address many of the relevant econometric issues in estimating the importance
of peer inuences on consumption, there may be a few limitations as discussed previously. However, even
with such limitations of the study, I nd robust evidence that peer consumption expenditure provide a strong
inuence on Indian householdsown consumption expenditure. These ndings suggest that policies that in-
uence a households consumption expenditure will also a¤ect the consumption decisions of the households
peers through social interactions. This implies that traditional analyses of consumption intervention pro-
grams that do not take into account such spillover e¤ects likely understate the total social impact of the
programs. Moreover, the ndings also suggest that it might be worthwhile to use innovative social policies
that represses social pressure together with traditional anti-poverty policies for raising social welfare in a
less developed country.
References
Akerlof, G.A. (1997). Social Distance and Social Decisions. Econometrica, 65, 10051027.
Angelucci, M., & De Giorgi, G. (2009). Indirect E¤ects of an Aid Program: How Do Cash Transfers A¤ect
IneligiblesConsumption? American Economic Review, 99, 486508.
26
Angelucci, M., De Giorgi, G., & Rasul, I. (2017). Consumption and Investment in Resource Pooling Family
Networks. Economic Journal (forthcoming).
Altonji, J. G., Elder, T. E., & Tabor, C. R. (2005). Selection on observed and unobserved variables: assessing
the e¤ectiveness of catholic schools. Journal of Political Economy, 113, 151184.
Ammermueller, A., & Pischke, J-S. (2009). Peer e¤ects in European primary schools: evidence from the
Progress in International Reading Literacy Study. Journal of Labor Economics, 27, 315348.
Baum, C.F., Scha¤er, M.E., & Stillman, S. (2007). Enhanced routines for instrumental variables/generalized
method of moments estimation and testing. Stata Journal, 7, 465506.
Bhuiyan, M.F. (2017). Life Satisfaction and Economic Position Relative to Neighbors: Perceptions Versus
Reality. Journal of Happiness Studies, forthcoming, 1-30.
Bifulco, R., Fletcher, J., & Ross, S. (2011). The e¤ect of classmate characteristics on individual outcomes:
evidence from the add health. American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, 3, 2553.
Boucher, V., Bramoulle, Y., Djebbari, H., & Fortin, B. (2014). Do peers a¤ect student achievement? Evidence
from Canada Using Group Size Variation. Journal of Applied Econometrics, 29, 91109.
Bound, J., Jaeger, D., & Baker, R. (1995). Problems with instrumental variables estimation when the
correlation between the instruments and the endogenous explanatory variable is weak. Journal of American
Statistical Association, 90, 443450.
Bramoullé, Y., Djebbari, H., & Fortin, B. (2009). Identication of peer e¤ects through social networks.
Journal of Econometrics, 150, 4155.
Brueckner, J.K. (2003). Strategic interaction among governments: an overview of empirical studies. Inter-
national Regional Science Review, 26, 175188.
Calvo-Armengol, A., Patacchini, E., & Zenou, Y. (2009). Peer e¤ects and social networks in education.
Review of Economic Studies, 76, 12391267.
Cameron, A.C., & Trivedi, P.K. (2005). Microeconometrics: Methods and Applications. New York: Cam-
bridge University Press.
Clark, A.E., & Oswald, A.J. (1998). Comparison-concave utility and following behaviour in social and
economic settings. Journal of Public Economics, 70, 133155.
Cli¤, A.D., & Ord, J.K. (1981). Spatial Processes: Models and Applications. London: Pion.
Cojocaru, A. (2014). Fairness and inequality tolerance: Evidence from the Life in Transition Survey. Journal
of Comparative Economics, 42, 590608.
Corneo, G. (2002). The e¢ cient side of progressive income taxation. European Economic Review. 46, 1359
1368.
De Giorgi, G., Frederiksen, A., & Pistaferri, L. (2016). Consumption Network E¤ects. NBER Working Paper
22357.
Deaton, A. (2001). Relative deprivation, inequality and mortality. NBER Working Paper 8099.
Desai, S., Dubey, A., & Vanneman, R. (2015). India Human Development Survey-II (IHDS-II) (Computer
le), University of Maryland and National Council of Applied Economic Research, New Delhi (producers),
2015. Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research (distributor).
Duesenberry, J.S. (1949). Income, Saving and the Theory of Consumer Behavior. Cambridge: Harvard
University Press.
Fafchamps, M., & Shilpi, F. (2008). Subjective welfare, isolation, and relative consumption. Journal of
Development Economics, 86, 4360.
Falk, A., & Knell, M. (2004). Choosing the joneses: endogenous goals and reference standards. Scandinavian
Journal of Economics, 106, 417435.
Festinger, L. (1954). A Theory of Social Comparison Processes. Human Relations, 7, 117140.
27
Fehr, E., & Schmidt, K.M. (2006). The Economics of Fairness, Reciprocity and Altruism Experimental
Evidence and New Theories. In S.-C. Kolm and J.M. Ythier (Eds.), Handbook on the Economics of Giving,
Reciprocity and Altruism, 1, p. 615691, Amsterdam: North Holland.
Fletcher, J. (2010). Social Interactions and Smoking: Evidence using Multiple Student Cohorts, Instrumental
Variables, and School Fixed E¤ects. Health Economics, 19, 466484.
Fletcher, J. (2012). Peer inuences on adolescent alcohol consumption: evidence using an instrumental
variables/xed e¤ect approach. Journal of Population Economics, 25,12651286.
Fletcher, J. (2015). Social interactions and college enrollment: A combined school xed e¤ects/instrumental
variables approach. Social Science Research, 52, 494507.
Gaviria, A., & Raphael, S. (2001). School-based Peer E¤ects and Juvenile Behavior. Review of Economics
and Statistics, 83, 257268.
Goux, D., & Maurin, E. (2007). Close Neighbours Matter: Neighbourhood E¤ects on Early Performance at
School. Economic Journal, 117, 11931215.
Gibbons, S., & Overman, H.G. (2012). Mostly Pointless Spatial Econometrics. Journal of Regional Science,
52, 172191.
Gibbons, S. Overman, H. G., & Patacchini, E. (2015). Spatial Methods. In: G. Duranton, J. V. Henderson
and W. C. Strange (Eds.), Handbook of Regional and Urban Economics, 5A, 115168, Amsterdam: North
Holland.
Glaeser, E.L., & Scheinkman, J. (2001). Measuring social interactions. In: S. Durlauf, S., H.P. Young (Eds.),
Social Dynamics, 83131, Cambridge: MIT Press.
Glaeser, E.L., Scheinkman, J. A., & Sacerdote, B. I. (2003). The Social Multiplier. Journal of the European
Economic Association, 1, 345353.
Graham, B.S. (2008). Identifying Social Interactions through Conditional Variance Restrictions. Economet-
rica, 76, 643660.
Grinblatt, M., Keloharju, M., & Ikäheimo, S. (2008). Social Inuence and Consumption: Evidence from the
Automobile Purchases of Neighbors. Review of Economics and Statistics, 90, 735753.
Hansen, L. (1982). Large sample properties of generalized method of moments estimators. Econometrica, 50,
10291054.
Helmers, C., & M. Patnam (2015). Does the rotten child spoil his companion? Spatial peer e¤ects among
children in rural India. Quantitative Economics, 5, 67121.
Indian National Census (2011a). Provisional Population Totals: Urban Agglom-
erations and Cities. Government of India, http://censusindia.gov.in/2011-prov-
results/paper2/data_les/India2/1.%20Data%20Highlight.pdf (last accessed September 30, 2016).
Indian National Census (2011b). Top 10 Smallest Districts of India by Total Area. Government of India,
http://www.census2011.co.in/facts/smalldistricts.html (last accessed September 30, 2016).
Kelejian, H.H., & Prucha, I.R. (1998). A Generalized Spatial Two-Stage Least Squares Procedure for Esti-
mating a Spatial Autoregressive Model with Autoregressive Disturbances. Journal of Real Estate Finance
and Economics, 17, 99121.
Kleibergen, F., & Paap, R. (2006). Generalized Reduced Rank Tests Using the Singular Value Decomposition.
Journal of Econometrics, 133, 97126.
Kuhn, P., Kooreman, P., Soetevent, A., & Kapteyn, A. (2011). The E¤ects of Lottery Prizes on Winners and
Their Neighbors: Evidence from the Dutch Postcode Lottery. American Economic Review, 101, 22262247.
Lavy, V., & Schlosser, A. (2011). Mechanisms and Impacts of Gender Peer E¤ects at School. American
Economic Journal: Applied Economics, 3, 133.
Lee, L.F. (2007). Identication and estimation of econometric models with group interactions, contextual
factors and xed e¤ects. Journal of Econometrics, 140, 333374.
Lee, L.F., Liu, X., & Lin, X. (2010). Specication and Estimation of Social Interaction Models with Network
Structures. Econometrics Journal, 13, 145176.
28
Manski, C. (1993). Identication of Endogenous Social E¤ects: The Reection Problem. Review of Economic
Studies, 60, 531542.
McVicar. D., & Polanski, A. (2014). Peer E¤ects in UK Adolescent Substance Use: Never Mind the Class-
mates? Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics, 76, 589604.
Moav, O., & Neeman, Z. (2012). Saving Rates and Poverty: The Role of Conspicuous Consumption and
Human Capital. Economic Journal, 122, 933956.
Moretti, E. (2011). Social Learning and Peer E¤ects in Consumption: Evidence from Movie Sales. Review
of Economic Studies, 78, 356393.
Munshi, K. (2016). Caste Networks in the Modern Indian Economy. In: S. Mahendra Dev and P. G. Babu
(Eds.), Development in India: Micro and Macro Perspectives, 13-37, New Delhi: Springer.
Munshi, K., & Rosenzweig, M. (2009). Why is Mobility in India so Low? Social Insurance, Inequality, and
Growth. NBER Working Paper No. 14850.
Munshi, K., & Rosenzweig, M. (2016). Networks and misallocation: Insurance, migration, and the rural-
urban wage gap. American Economic Review, 106, 4698.
Paternoster, R., Brame, R., Mazerolle, P., & Piquero, A. (1998). Using the correct statistical test for the
equality of regression coe¢ cients. Criminology, 36, 859866.
Putnam, R.D. (2007). E Pluribus Unum: diversity and community in the twenty-rst century (The 2006
Johan Skytte Prize Lecture). Scandinavian Political Studies, 30, 13774
Ravallion, M., & Lokshin, M. (2010). Who cares about relative deprivation? Journal of Economic Behavior
& Organization, 73, 171-185.
Roychowdhury, P. (2016). Visible inequality, status competition and conspicuous consumption: evidence
from rural India. Oxford Economic Papers, 63, 3654.
Sacerdote, B. (2001). Peer e¤ects with random assignment: results for Dartmouth roommates. Quarterly
Journal of Economics, 116, 681704.
Sacerdote, B. (2011). Peer E¤ects in Education: How Might They Work, How Big Are They and How Much
Do We Know Thus Far? In: E.A. Hanushek, S. Machin and L. Woessmann (Eds.), Handbook of Economics
of Education, 3, 249277, Amsterdam: North Holland.
Staiger, D., & Stock, J.H. (1997). Instrumental variables regression with weak instruments. Econometrica,
65, 557586.
Stark, O., & Taylor, J.E. (1991). Migration incentives, migration types: the role of relative deprivation.
Economic Journal, 101, 11631178.
Stock, J., Wright, J., & Yogo, M. (2002). A survey of weak instruments and weak identication in generalized
method of moments. Journal of Business & Economic Statistics, 20, 518529.
Stock, J.H., & Yogo, M. (2005). Testing for weak instruments in linear IV regression. In: D.W. Andrews
and J.H. Stock (Eds.), Identication and Inference for Econometric Models: Essays in Honor of Thomas
Rothenberg, 80108, New York: Cambridge University Press.
Telle, N.T., & Pster, H.R. (2016). Positive empathy and prosocial behavior: a neglected link. Emotion
Review, 8, 154-163.
29
Table 1. Variable Definitions and Summary Statistics       
      Own Characteristics   Peers' Mean 
Characteristics 
Variables Definition N Mean SD   Mean SD 
Consumption Annual total household consumption expenditure (Indian Rupees) 40980 115239 111528 
 
115239 54545 
Income Annual total household income (Indian Rupees) 40980 118130 130239 
 
118130 71653 
Household Size Total number of people in the household 40980 4.85 2.29 
 
4.85 0.91 
Age Age of household head 40980 49.62 13.55 
 
49.62 4.7 
Male = 1 if household head is male; = 0 otherwise 40980 0.86 0.35 
 
0.86 0.11 
Literate = 1 if household head is literate; = 0 otherwise 40980 0.68 0.47 
 
0.68 0.22 
Married = 1 if household head is married; = 0 otherwise 40980 0.81 0.39 
 
0.81 0.12 
(Children Proportion) Number of children/Total number of people in the household 40980 0.24 0.22 
 
0.24 0.09 
Teenage Proportion Number of teens/Total number of people in the household 40980 0.11 0.16 
 
0.11 0.05 
Adult Proportion Number of adults/Total number of people in the household 40980 0.65 0.23 
 
0.65 0.1 
(No Married) = 1 if there are no married people in the household; = 0 otherwise 40980 0.09 0.28 
 
0.09 0.08 
One to Five Married = 1 if there are more than zero and less than five married people in the 
household; = 0 otherwise 
40980 0.87 0.33 
 
0.87 0.09 
More than Five Married = 1 if there are more than five married people in the household; 0 otherwise 40980 0.04 0.19 
 
0.04 0.05 
Years in Place = 1 if the household has been living in the same place for more than 10 years; 
0 otherwise 
40980 0.97 0.18 
 
0.97 0.08 
Urban = 1 if the household's place of residence is categorized as Urban as per the 
2011 Census; 0 otherwise 
40980 0.35 0.48 
 
0.35 0.48 
Brahmin = 1 if household head's caste is Brahmin; 0 otherwise 40980 0.05 0.22 
 
0.05 0.11 
Forward Caste = 1 if household head's caste is Non-Brahmin Forward Caste; = 0 otherwise 40980 0.23 0.42 
 
0.23 0.26 
OBC = 1 if household head's caste is Other backward Classes (OBC); = 0 otherwise  40980 0.41 0.49 
 
0.41 0.3 
SC = 1 if household head's caste is Scheduled Caste (SC); = 0 otherwise  40980 0.22 0.41 
 
0.22 0.23 
ST = 1 if household head's caste is Scheduled Tribe (ST); = 0 otherwise  40980 0.09 0.28 
 
0.09 0.21 
(Other Caste) = 1 if household head is a member of some other caste; = 0 otherwise 40980 0.01 0.11 
 
0.01 0.06 
Job Loss = 1 if a household member has lost job in the recent past; = 0 otherwise 40980 0.03 0.16 
 
0.03 0.08 
Death = 1 if there has been a death in the recent past; 0 = otherwise 40980 0.19 0.39 
 
0.19 0.13 
Theft = 1 if there has been an incident of theft in the household in the recent past; = 0 
otherwise 
40980 0.04 0.19 
 
0.04 0.07 
Break-in = 1 if the household faced an incident of break-in in the recent past; = 0 
otherwise 
40980 0.01 0.1   0.01 0.03 
Notes: The variables in the parentheses are the omitted categories in the following estimations. 
 
Table 2. Peer Effects in Consumption: OLS Estimation  
Variables [1] [2] [3] 
    
Endogenous Peer Effect 0.461*** 0.568*** 0.207*** 
 (0.013) (0.017) (0.026) 
Household Effects YES YES YES 
Idiosyncratic Shocks YES YES YES 
Contextual Effects NO YES YES 
District Fixed Effects NO NO YES 
    
Observations 40980 40980 40980 
Adjusted R-squared 0.324 0.329 0.338 
 
 
Notes: Dependent variable is Household Annual Total Consumption Expenditure. 
Endogenous Peer Effect represents the estimated coefficient of Average Peer 
Household Annual Total Consumption Expenditure.  Household effects are 
controlled by own demographic characteristics of households that include Income, 
Household Size, Age, Male, Literate, Married, Teenage Proportion, Adult 
Proportion, One to Five Married, More than Five Married, Years in Place, Urban, 
Brahmin, Forward Caste, OBC, SC and ST. Idiosyncratic shocks include Job Loss, 
Death, Theft and Break-in. Contextual effects are controlled by average peer 
demographic characteristics. For definition of variables see Table 1.   
Heteroscedasticity robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, 
* p<0.1. 
Table 3. Validity of Instruments: Balancing Test    
Dependent Variable 
Peer Job 
Loss Peer Death Peer Theft 
Peer Break-
in F-statistic Observations 
Income 11716 8246 6630 -15261 0.88 40980 
 (13460) (5877) (12505) (23283) [p=0.474]  
Household Size 0.077 0.156 0.082 -0.589 1.21 40980 
 (0.215) (0.103) (0.217) (0.401) [p=0.305]  
Age -0.478 1.734*** -1.087 -1.417 2.31 40980 
 (1.415) (0.626) (1.301) (2.458) [p=0.055]  
Male 0.0273 0.023 0.080** -0.156** 2.99 40980 
 (0.035) (0.017) (0.033) (0.064) [p=0.018]  
Literate 0.011 0.023 0.064 0.010 1.13 40980 
 (0.045) (0.020) (0.043) (0.077) [p=0.340]  
Married 0.047 0.035* 0.093 -0.095 3.12 40980 
 (0.039) (0.018) (0.037) (0.071) [p=0.014]  
Children Proportion 0.013 0.006 -0.002 0.049 0.60 40980 
 (0.022) (0.010) (0.021) (0.040) [p=0.663]  
Teenage Proportion -0.012 -0.012 0.012 -0.014 0.85 40980 
 (0.017) (0.008) (0.016) (0.031) [p=0.492]  
Adult Proportion -0.000 0.006 -0.011 -0.035 0.45 40980 
 (0.024) (0.010) (0.021) (0.041) [p=0.772]  
No Married -0.077** -0.021 -0.036 0.081 3.39 40980 
 (0.030) (0.013) (0.026) (0.054) [p=0.009]  
One to Five Married 0.077** -0.002 0.051 -0.120* 2.48 40980 
 (0.035) (0.016) (0.031) (0.063) [p=0.042]  
More than Five Married 0.000 0.023** -0.015 0.0388 1.92 40980 
 (0.019) (0.009) (0.018) (0.034) [p=0.105]  
Years in Place -0.008 0.006 -0.016 -0.000 0.43 40980 
 (0.019) (0.007) (0.018) (0.037) [p=0.786]  
Brahmin -0.014 0.002 -0.010 0.027 0.21 40980 
 (0.021) (0.009) (0.023) (0.045) [p=0.934]  
Forward Caste 0.016 -0.007 -0.027 0.046 0.26 40980 
 (0.037) (0.017) (0.035) (0.076) [p=0.903]  
OBC -0.023 -0.016 0.033 -0.071 0.49 40980 
 (0.042) (0.019) (0.041) (0.080) [p=0.744]  
SC 0.026 0.022 0.005 -0.023 0.60 40980 
 (0.039) (0.017) (0.036) (0.071) [p=0.663]  
ST -0.015 -0.000 -0.002 0.025 0.32 40980 
 (0.018) (0.008) (0.019) (0.034) [p=0.868]  
Other Caste 0.009 -0.000 0.000 -0.004 0.13 40980 
  (0.015) (0.0051) (0.008) (0.016) [p=0.973]   
 
 
Notes: Each row shows results of regression of a specific household demographic characteristic on different types of average 
peer shocks. Additional controls in each regression include own idiosyncratic shocks, average peer characteristics and district 
fixed effects. For definition of variables see Table 1. All regressions are estimated by OLS and include a constant. 
Heteroscedasticity robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
Table 4. Peer Effects in Consumption: IV Estimation 
Variables [1] [2] [3] 
    
Endogenous Peer Effect 0.782*** 0.848*** 0.697*** 
 (0.147) (0.128) (0.223) 
Household Effects YES YES YES 
Idiosyncratic Shocks YES YES YES 
Contextual Effects NO YES YES 
District Fixed Effects NO NO YES 
    
Observations 40980 40980 40980 
Adjusted R-squared 0.305 0.321 0.325 
Hansen J statistic 6.096 4.355 1.829 
 [p=0.107] [p=0.226] [p=0.609] 
Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistic 147.5 339.9 154.8 
 [p=0.000] [p=0.000] [p=0.000] 
First stage F-statistic 38.03 89.97 40.01 
 
 
Notes: Estimation via two-step GMM. Dependent variable is Household Annual 
Total Consumption Expenditure. Endogenous Peer Effect represents the estimated 
coefficient of Average Peer Household Annual Total Consumption Expenditure. 
Household effects are controlled by own demographic characteristics of 
households. Contextual effects are controlled by average peer demographic 
characteristics. For full list of demographic characteristic, idiosyncratic shocks 
and definition of variables see Table 1 and note below Table 2.  Heteroscedasticity 
robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
Table 5. Peer Effects in Consumption: Subsample Analysis             
   Subsamples 
Variables  Non-Poor Poor   Upper Caste Lower Caste   Urban Rural 
                 
Endogenous Peer Effect  0.727*** 0.024  0.887** 0.565**  0.873*** 0.754*** 
  (0.240) (0.079)  (0.360) (0.240)  (0.304) (0.227) 
          
Observations  34,168 6,812  11,465 29,515  14,171 26,809 
Adjusted R-squared  0.218 0.735  0.190 0.199  0.185 0.195 
Hansen J statistic  3.597 7.773  0.416 2.815  1.493 0.766 
  [p=0.308] [p=0.0509]  [p=0.937] [p=0.421]  [p=0.684] [p=0.858] 
Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistic  133.6 39.37  68.70 121.2  95.99 191.5 
  [p=0.000] [p=0.000]  [p=0.000] [p=0.000]  [p=0.000] [p=0.000] 
First stage F-statistic  34.49 10.61  17.26 32.30  25.23 53.03 
z-statistic   2.786   0.744   0.314 
 
Notes: Estimation via two-step GMM. Dependent variable is Household Annual Total Consumption Expenditure. Endogenous Peer Effect 
represents the estimated coefficient of Average Peer Household Annual Total Consumption Expenditure. All specifications include controls for 
household effects, own idiosyncratic shocks, contextual effects and district fixed effects. Household effects are controlled by own demographic 
characteristics of households. Contextual effects are controlled by average peer demographic characteristics. For full list of demographic 
characteristic, idiosyncratic shocks, definition of variables and definition of subsamples see Table 1, and note below Table 2.  Heteroscedasticity 
robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
Table 6. Peer Effects in Consumption: Investigating Omitted Variable Bias 
Variables   [1] [2] [3]   [4] [5]   [6] [7] 
  Covariate Shock Controls  
Controls for Correlates of 
Empathy/Reciprocity  Local Public Good Controls 

















           
Endogenous Peer Effect  0.684*** 0.681*** 0.681***  0.673*** 0.662***   0.707*** 0.783*** 
  (0.238) (0.236) (0.289)  (0.244) (0.245)  (0.250) (0.257) 
           
Observations  40,980 40,980 40,980  40,948  40,951   25,772  25,659 
Adjusted R-squared  0.326 0.326 0.332  0.334 0.335   0.3077  0.3048 
Hansen J statistic  1.926 1.834 1.997   1.771  1.927  0.420 0.519 
  [p=0.588] [p=0.608] [p=0.573]  [p=0.621] [p=0.588]  [p=0.936] [p= 0.915] 
Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistic  135.6 137.5 129.5  129.44 128.99  164.673  170.685 
  [p=0.000] [p=0.000] [p=0.000]  [p=0.000] [p=0.000]  [p=0.000] [p=0.000] 
First stage F-statistic   34.90 35.45 33.28   33.25 33.14   44.55 46.56 
 
Notes: Estimation via two-step GMM. Dependent variable is Household Annual Total Consumption Expenditure. Endogenous Peer Effect represents the estimated coefficient of Average 
Peer Household Annual Total Consumption Expenditure. All specifications include controls for household effects, own idiosyncratic shocks, contextual effects and district fixed effects. 
Additionally, the regressions reported in columns (1) - (3) include controls for covariate shocks, regressions in columns (4) and (5) include controls for variables that are strong correlates 
of social emotions like empathy and reciprocity, and the regressions reported in the last two columns include controls for local public goods. Household effects are controlled by own 
demographic characteristics of households. Contextual effects are controlled by average peer demographic characteristics. For full list of demographic characteristics, idiosyncratic 
shocks and definition of variables see Table 1 and note below Table 2.  Heteroscedasticity robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
Table 7. Peer Effects in Consumption Based on Alternative Definitions of Reference Groups 
Variables   [1]   [2]   [3] 
  
Village/Neighborhood 
and Caste  
Village/Neighborhood 
and Migrant Status  
Village/Neighborhood, 
Caste and Migrant 
Status 
       
Endogenous Peer Effect  0.593***  0.644***  0.583*** 
  (0.216)  (0.215)  (0.206) 
       
Observations  40,081  39,414   38286 
Adjusted R-squared   0.328   0.332  0.3274 
Hansen J statistic  3.482   0.915   1.896 
  [p=0.323]  [p=0.8219]  [p=0.594] 
Kleibergen-Paap rk LM 
statistic  117.464  146.433  119.297 
  [p=0.000]  [p=0.000]  [p=0.000] 
First stage F-statistic   29.23   37.58    29.57 
 
Notes: Estimation via two-step GMM. Dependent variable is Household Annual Total Consumption Expenditure. First 
column report results of regression when peer reference group is defined by village/neighborhood of residence and caste 
(i.e. households in the same village and same caste group form a peer reference group). Second column report results of 
regression when peer reference group is defined by village of residence and migrant status (i.e., households within a village 
who have not sent out migrants for work form a peer reference group, whereas households within a village who have sent 
out migrants form a different peer group). Third column report results of regression when peer reference group is defined 
by village of residence, caste, and migrant status. Endogenous Peer Effect represents the estimated coefficient of Average 
Peer Household Annual Total Consumption Expenditure. All specifications include controls for household effects, own 
idiosyncratic shocks, contextual effects and district fixed effects. Household effects are controlled by own demographic 
characteristics of households. Contextual effects are controlled by average peer demographic characteristics. For full list 
of demographic characteristics, idiosyncratic shocks and definition of variables see Table 1 and note below Table 2.  
Heteroscedasticity robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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1 Social Multiplier
Endogenous peer e¤ects imply that small exogenous shock at the individual level is magnied through the
social interactions process to deliver larger aggregate level social e¤ects. Glaeser and Scheinkman (2001) and
Glaeser et al. (2003) dene the social multiplier as the ratio of the individual e¤ect from an exogenous shock
to the aggregate e¤ect from the same shock. In what follows, I derive the social multiplier for my baseline
econometric model:
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Thus, equation (1) can be rewritten as







where Mi;r denotes peer group of household i and (mr   1) denotes size of the peer group.
















where Mr denotes the social group to which household i belongs to. This is the aggregate level equation.













Equation (6) is the individual/household level equation. To simplify the analysis, I consider a three-person
social group (i.e., mr = 3). Let the individuals be indexed by i = 1, 2, 3. Further, I assume  =  =  = 0
and there is a unique exogenous characteristic x that a¤ects household consumption. Thus I have:
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2 Additional Robustness Checks
In this section, I conduct various robustness checks to assess the robustness of my estimates to di¤erent sorts
of bias.
Using Consumption and Income in Logs. As noted by Suri (2004), a question that arises in the
empirical work relating to consumption is whether to look at logs or levels of consumption, since in theory,
consumption is assumed to follow a log normal distribution (Battistin et al., 2009). Similar question also
arises in context of income. Although, given that I have a large enough sample, using consumption and
income in logs is not necessary, it is worthwhile to check whether there is any qualitative change in my
baseline results when I take a log-transformation of the variables in question.
I present the results in column (1) of Table A4. Reassuringly, I nd that the results remain qualitatively
unaltered.
Measurement Error in Income. Measurement error in household income is always a concern in survey
data. To show that this issue does not inuence my main results, I re-estimate my baseline econometric model
now instrumenting households own income by literacy status of household heads father (or household heads
husbands father, in case the household head is a woman). I also instrument average peer income by average
literacy status of peer household heads father (or peer household heads husbands father). The assumption
here is that whether a household heads father was literate or not a¤ects earnings of the household, but
whether a peer household heads father was literate or not has no direct inuence on the households own
earnings. Column (2) of Table A4 reports the results from this exercise. As it turns out, the point estimate
of endogenous peer e¤ect remains almost unchanged compared to the baseline results.
Exclusion of IVs. One potential critique of my IV strategy is that peer idiosyncratic shocks may have
direct impact on own consumption. If this is true, the exclusion restriction for the instruments to work well
is violated. To examine this, I report results of additional specications in Table A5.
In each of the specication, I use two out of four instruments to instrument the endogenous peer e¤ect
and include the remaining two instruments as additional regressors in the second stage. I do this for all
possible combinations of my instruments (hence, I report results from six specications). I then examine
whether the coe¢ cients of instrument included as regressors in the second stage are statistically signicant
or not. I nd that, across all the specications, the coe¢ cients of instruments in question are statistically
indistinguishable from zero. This implies that, conditional on any two instruments being valid, the other
instruments are excluded from the second stage. In other words, if one is willing to believe that only two
instruments are valid (and is not sure about the validity of the remaining ones), this exercise shows that
conditional on that belief, the remaining instruments are likely to be valid as well. This increases my
condence in the overall set of instruments used to identify my baseline model.
Typeof Idiosyncratic Shock matters? Note that the instruments used is in this study are all con-
structed based upon idiosyncratic shocks that are negativeand accidentalin nature (or due to bad luck).
The consumption expenditure adjustment due to status seeking behavior may be very di¤erent when a neigh-
bor wins a lottery (compared to the case when there is a death in the family of my neighbors) for instance.
However, testing this empirically is di¢ cult in the present context, because all the questions that are speci-
cally on expenditure shocks in the IHDS are essentially negative and accidental in nature. However, there is
one question in the survey questionnaire which could be uses to address this concern. This question is regard-
ing the sources of household income. Specically, there is question in the IHDS that asks households whether
a part of their earnings come from lottery, dowry or chit fund. I create a dummy variable that takes a value
equal to 1 if the household has received some earnings from lottery, dowry or chit funds, and zero otherwise.
I treat this as a shock to household income (and expenditure) that is due to the household trying to be
greedy. The nature of this shock is likely to be very di¤erent from that of the shocks that I have used in my
baseline analysis. Based on this shock, I now create an additional instrument (the procedure of constructing
the instrument remains the same as before, i.e., I take the average of the shocks over all the households
in my reference group, leaving out myself). I, then, use this average peer lottery/chit fund/dowryshock
as an instrument for average peer consumption. I report two specications. First, in which I use only this
instrument. Second, in which I use this new instrument along with the other instruments that I had already
been using. The results are reported in Table A6 (however, note that I now use state xed e¤ects, since
within a district the variation in the lottery/chit fund/dowry shock is extremely low). It turns out the
estimate of the endogenous peer e¤ect falls slightly (compared to the baseline estimates) when only the new
instrument is used, and remains almost unchanged when the new instrument is used along with the other
instruments. This is reassuring, and provides at least some suggestive evidence that the specic typeof
shock is unlikely to be driving my estimates of the endogenous peer e¤ects.
Excluding (Relatively) Recent Migrant-Households. As noted in the main text, household-level
migration is remarkably low in India. Consequently, selection of households into villages/neighborhoods is
unlikely to result in biased coe¢ cients of endogenous peer e¤ects. However, to provide further evidence that
selection into villages or neighborhoods is unlikely to be an issue of concern, I exclude the households who
report to have migrated in the last 10 years from the sample, and re-estimate the baseline model. The results
are reported in Table A7. As evident, the estimate of the endogenous peer e¤ect remains almost altered
compared to the baseline results. Specically, the coe¢ cient of endogenous peer e¤ect now is 0.73, whereas
in the baseline case it was 0.69. As an additional sensitivity check, I delete all those households who report
to have been migrated in the last 20 years, and I repeat the same exercise. Again, the point estimates are
similar to that obtained from the baseline regression. Thus, my baseline estimate of the endogenous peer
e¤ect is unlikely to be inconsistent due to selection of households into villages/neighborhoods.
Using Prices as Additional Controls. Next, I examine whether my results are driven by prices of goods
that are consumed/purchased by the households in my sample. Although, IHDS does not have information
about prices at the household level of all goods and services, it has information on prices of most (specically
11) non-tradable goods, which according to the FAO, are goods that are mainly sold locally and produced
in rural villages (rather than in urban cities).1 These goods are basically staple goods including rice, wheat,
pulses, sugar, etc. Households are asked the market price of these 11 staple goods, and then are asked
whether they have purchased these goods or whether the goods that they use are homegrown. I create
a household level price index based on this information. Specically, for a particular good, I multiply
the market price of the good (which is reported by the household) by a dummy taking a value of one if
the household has purchased that particular good, and then repeat this for all the 11 goods, and nally
take the average of these. Although, this is a crude measure of prices that the households face, I use this
to check the sensitivity of my baseline results by including this as an additional control. Note, in this
specication, I also control for the local price level. I dene this as the average level of prices computed
1http://www.fao.org/docrep/w9500e/w9500e12.htm
at the village/neighborhood level that I calculate based on the prices reported by the households living in
a particular village/neighborhood (excluding the focal household). I also report results of an additional
specication: I deate total consumption expenditure by the price index that I have computed, and estimate
the baseline regression model using deated (own and peer) consumption expenditure. Results are reported
in Table A8. Reassuringly, the estimate of the endogenous peer e¤ect, across both the specications, roughly
remains unchanged compared to initial estimate of the endogenous peer e¤ect obtained from the baseline
regression model (i.e., the endogenous peer e¤ect remains close to 0.7, which is what it was in the baseline
case).
Issue of Individual-level Migration. As noted in the main text, it may be the case that households who
send out migrants (who send remittances back home) may be very di¤erent in their wealth levels from the
households who do not, and hence they may not serve as a reference peer group. To examine this issue,
I compute the summary statistics relating to migration from the IHDS data. Specically, the IHDS asks
household heads: Have you or any member of your household left to nd seasonal/short term work during
last ve years? It turns out that out of 41,000 (approximately) households surveyed by the IHDS, only
2,600 households answer yesto this question (of which 2,343 are rural households). Since these households
can potentially be very di¤erent and not serve as a reference peer group, I drop these households from my
analytical sample (under the assumption that this sample of households come from a di¤erent data generating
process (DGP)), and re-estimate the baseline regression model. Results are reported in column (1) of Table
A9. I nd that even after putting this additional cut on the sample, the IV estimates of the endogenous peer
e¤ect remain statistically and economically signicant. The magnitude of the estimate is also remarkably
similar to the baseline results.2
Using Sampling Weights. Survey weights are often a critical part of representativeness of a survey.
However, as noted by Gelman (2007), Kott (2007), Winship and Radbill (1994), and Young and Johnson
(2012), there is little consensus on whether weights should be routinely used in multivariate models, such as
regression. In general, the literature concludes that including weights in a regression model is likely to make
the estimates less e¢ cient. Consequently, it is often suggested that, instead of using weights, adopting a
model-based method might be preferable. A model-based strategy does not use the weights but includes the
variables used to construct the weights as variables in the regression model as regressor. As noted by Young
and Johnson (2012), this will provide unbiased and consistent parameter estimates even without explicitly
using the sample weights. A similar recommendation is also made by Arellano (2014). He recommends that,
2 In addition to this, I also estimate a specication where I do not exclude households that send out migrants, but instead
include a dummy regressor in the right-hand side that takes a value of 1 if the household answers yes to the migration
question. Results remain unaltered. I do not report this regression; however the results are available upon request.
when using data from surveys that are done using stratied random sampling, there is no need to use sample
weights in estimation if stratication is based exclusively on the variables that are included as controls in
the regression (call them x) (i.e. the stratication variables are functions of x). The standard unweighted
estimator remains consistent in the stratied sample.
Now, it is often the case that one does not have full knowledge about how weights are constructed or
how stratication is done. As such, even if one uses a su¢ ciently large number of relevant covariates as
right-hand side variables, one can never sure whether he/she has included all the relevant variables based on
which stratication is done. In that case, to decide whether one should use weights or not, it is recommended
that one should carry out a sensitivity analysis and compare the coe¢ cients of interest from analysis with
and without weights. As noted by Young and Johnson (2012), if the coe¢ cients do not signicantly di¤er,
then weights are unnecessary.
In my baseline analysis, since I have a large set of control variables including individual level controls,
village/neighborhood level controls, plus district xed e¤ects, I have not used survey weights under the
assumption that stratication variables (or the weights) are likely to functions of the controls included in my
model (in other words, I have followed the model-based approach). However, as noted previously, the validity
of such an assumption is questionable when one does not have perfect knowledge about how exactly weights
are created. As such, to check whether my assumption is likely to be valid, and whether my unweighted
parameter estimates are consistent, I follow the general recommendation in the literature and check the
sensitivity of my baseline results to inclusion of survey weights provided by the IHDS. Results are reported
in column (2) of Table A9. I nd that the point estimates of the endogenous peer e¤ects remain statistically
and economically signicant as before, and that it is not signicantly di¤erent from the baseline estimate
(based on the results of the z-test (Paternoster, 1998)). As such, I conclude that my baseline unweighted
estimates of the endogenous peer e¤ects are consistent.
3 Extension: Disaggregate Analysis
My data distinguishes between several di¤erent categories of consumption expenditure. This allows me to
investigate more specically the composition of the increase in own consumption expenditure in response to
an increase in average peer consumption. I report the estimation results in Table A10.
I nd that an increase in average peer consumption has a huge impact on own expenditure on temptation
goods,3 and a moderate impact on own food expenditure. More specically, a 1 Indian Rupee increase in
average peer consumption leads to a 0.48 Indian Rupee increase in own expenditure on temptation goods
3Expenditure on temptation goods include spending on entertainment, vacation, jewelry, clothing/bedding, footwear, etc.
See Table A1 for the full list of temptation goods.
and 0.13 Indian Rupee increase in own expenditure on food items. These e¤ects are statistically as well as
economically signicant. The impacts of an increase in average peer consumption on own health expenditure
and own education expenditure, although positive, are much smaller compared to what I have found for the
cases of temptation goods and food. Moreover, these e¤ects are also imprecisely estimated. Overall, the
results of the disaggregate analysis suggests that the increase in own consumption due to endogenous peer
e¤ect is driven by increase in own expenditure on temptation goods and food.4
4 Alternative Mechanism: Can the Results be Explained by Risk
Sharing?
An alternative mechanism driving my results could be partial risk-sharing against idiosyncratic income
shocks (Townsend, 1994).5 According to the partial risk sharing hypothesis, own consumption co-moves
with average peer consumption, albeit imperfectly. This means that the endogenous peer e¤ects obtained
in this paper may be due to partial risk sharing rather than due to status seeking behavior. So, in order to
establish the validity of status seeking behavior as the plausible mechanism driving my ndings, it becomes
critical to rule out partial risk sharing (although it is apparent that distinguishing status seeking behavior
from partial risk sharing is extremely di¢ cult in practice since the predictions of the two models are virtually
identical).
One way to assess (although somewhat adhoc) whether the model of partial risk sharing can explain my
results is to look at the results of the heterogeneity/subsample analysis. The central idea of the analysis
is as follows. According to Townsend (1994), mutual coinsurance is likely to be more relevant for people
living in a high risk environment with (almost) no formal risk reduction mechanism. As such, it is likely
to be the case that, under partial risk sharing, the co-movement in consumption is likely to be greater for
the people who are economically more vulnerable and who are exposed to high degrees of risk compared to
the people who are economically less vulnerable and who are exposed to low degrees of risk (in fact, the
risk sharing model may actually be irrelevant for the latter group of people). If I assume people who are
economically more vulnerable and live in a high risk environment are more likely to be living in rural areas
than in urban areas, are members of low caste than of high caste, and/or live below the poverty line, then
4The disaggregate analysis is subject to a caveat. Note that my baseline model given by Equation (9) implies that if I use a
expenditure on a certain type of goods as my dependent variable, expenditure on all other consumption goods ends up in the
error term on the right hand side (unless they are explicitly controlled for). This means that the error term becomes correlated
with all the regressors in the model. Now, if my instruments are correlated with some of these regressors in addition to being
correlated with average peer consumption, then the estimate of the coe¢ cient of average peer consumption will no longer be
consistent.
5Partial risk sharing implies that individuals coinsure income uctuations imperfectly(i.e., they pool only a part of their
income). Instead, the individuals could be perfectly coinsuring income uctuations. However, as noted by Schulhofer-Wohl
(2011), full risk sharing has almost always been rejected in data.
it should be the case that the magnitude of the co-movement in consumption (in other words, the estimate
of the endogenous peer e¤ect) is greater for those living in rural areas, are members of low caste than of
high caste, and living below the poverty line than their counterparts. This, however, is not what I nd in
my heterogeneity analysis reported in the main paper (Table 6). Specically, for all the cases I either nd
that the di¤erence between the estimated endogenous peer e¤ects for two subsamples is not statistically
signicant or that the estimate of the endogenous e¤ect is signicantly lower for the subsample which is
economically more vulnerable. This provides suggestive evidence that my baseline results are unlikely to be
explained by the mechanism of partial risk sharing.6
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Table A1. Categories of Consumption: IHDS 2012 
Food Vegetables Soap/detergent Therapeutic appliances 
Rice Salts/spices Conveyance Personal care 
Wheat Tea/Coffee Diesel/Petrol/CNG Other personal expenditure 
Sugar Processed food House/other rent/ loans Repair/maintenance 
Kerosene Paan/Tobacco Consumer tax/fees Insurance premiums 
Other Cereal Fruits/Nuts Services/servants Vacations 
Pulses Temptation Good Clothing/bedding Social Functions 
Meat Eating out Footwear Health 
Sweeteners Fuel Furnitures/fixtures Medical out-patient 
Edible Oil Light Crockery/utensils Medical in-patient 
Eggs Entertainment Household appliances Education 
Milk Telephone Recreation goods School/college fees 
Milk products Cosmetics/Toiletries Jewelry Private tuition 

















Table A2. Peer Effects in Consumption: OLS Estimation (Full Results) 
Variables [1] [2] [3] 
        
Endogenous Peer Effect 0.461*** 0.568*** 0.208*** 
 (0.0132) (0.0173) (0.0256) 
Household Effects    
Income 0.283*** 0.291*** 0.291*** 
 (0.00838) (0.00892) (0.00893) 
Household Size 8327*** 8564*** 8414*** 
 (352.4) (357.5) (355.7) 
Age 60.11 83.41** 104.9** 
 (40.62) (40.94) (41.33) 
Male -4531** -4776** -5317** 
 (2156) (2142) (2147) 
Literate 15047*** 16211*** 17011*** 
 (901.6) (929.8) (946.0) 
Married -1380 -1704 -2080 
 (2329) (2335) (2341) 
Teenage Proportion 53137*** 52975*** 52022*** 
 (3274) (3264) (3250) 
Adult Proportion 34547*** 33183*** 31926*** 
 (3169) (3161) (3185) 
Zero to Five Married 20652*** 20505*** 21472*** 
 (2127) (2109) (2124) 
More than Five Married 34309*** 33236*** 33475*** 
 (4677) (4657) (4566) 
Years in Place -6196** -3461 -3497 
 (2767) (2908) (2928) 
Urban -48.03 1997 5144*** 
 (1191) (1230) (1713) 
Brahmin -11827* -9402 -10226* 
 (6206) (6207) (6133) 
Forward Caste -13286** -6932 -7412 
 (5823) (5786) (5697) 
OBC -17472*** -15945*** -16533*** 
 (5751) (5728) (5656) 
SC -29420*** -29953*** -30424*** 
 (5748) (5682) (5604) 
ST -28145*** -27050*** -27395*** 
 (5827) (5925) (5870) 
Individual Idiosyncratic Shocks    
Job Loss 1035 1292 4282 
 (2538) (2552) (2829) 
Death 4767*** 4579*** 4015*** 
 (1174) (1168) (1171) 
Theft 14865*** 14721*** 14807*** 




Table A2. Peer Effects in Consumption, OLS Full Results (Continued) 
Variables [1] [2] [3] 
        
Break-in 130.0 549.5 923.7 
 (5869) (5837) (5835) 
Contextual Effects    
Income  -0.0953*** 0.00343 
  (0.0131) (0.0154) 
Household Size  -3805*** -3163*** 
  (978.5) (1,184) 
Age  -254.3* 119.4 
  (149.9) (162.1) 
Male  -159.4 -10,961 
  (8420) (9229) 
Literate  -12699*** 7032* 
  (2734) (3704) 
Married  864.4 -3,242 
  (8066) (9088) 
Teenage Proportion  -5659 -3478 
  (11852) (12677) 
Adult Proportion  7392 -1414 
  (10709) (12168) 
Zero to Five Married  -9865 13214 
  (8496) (9302) 
More than Five Married  -23304* -6461 
  (12862) (14629) 
Years in Place  -23773*** -25290*** 
  (7872) (9472) 
Brahmin  2890 -11266 
  (11421) (14217) 
Forward Caste  -10770 -19472 
  (10609) (12849) 
OBC  -1717 -15194 
  (10398) (12771) 
SC  8984 -7720 
  (10404) (12553) 
ST  628.2 -12260 
  (10460) (12583) 
Constant -43477*** 15876 8212 
 (7009) (15756) (19702) 
District Fixed Effects NO NO YES 
    
Observations 40980 40980 40980 
Adjusted R-squared 0.324 0.329 0.338 
 
 
Notes: Dependent variable is Household Annual Total Consumption Expenditure. 
Endogenous Peer Effect represents the estimated coefficient of Average Peer 
Household Annual Total Consumption Expenditure. For definition of variables see 
Table 1. Heteroscedasticity robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** 
p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
Table A3. Peer Effects in Consumption: IV Estimation (First Stage and Second Stage Full Results) 
Variables [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] 
              
Endogenous Peer Effect  0.782***  0.848***  0.697*** 
  (0.147)  (0.128)  (0.223) 
Household Effects       
Income 0.102*** 0.250*** 0.0109*** 0.289*** 0.00547*** 0.289*** 
 (0.00261) (0.0166) (0.00207) (0.00885) (0.00161) (0.00887) 
Household Size -125.1 8,422*** 130.2 8,528*** -112.1 8,453*** 
 (154.4) (353.6) (116.8) (356.0) (88.40) (359.5) 
Age 38.57* 49.91 -29.21* 92.31** 11.05 101.2** 
 (21.63) (42.45) (16.41) (40.79) (12.08) (41.52) 
Male -4000*** -3285 -474.3 -4802** -952.1 -4860** 
 (1167) (2230) (885.6) (2152) (679.7) (2158) 
Literate 5346*** 13357*** -550.6 16381*** 743.8** 16628*** 
 (514.3) (1220) (402.3) (934.2) (298.8) (956.5) 
Married 1209 -1530 409.8 -1696 -148.4 -1985 
 (1148) (2349) (851.2) (2335) (650.9) (2341) 
Teenage Proportion 6320*** 50861*** 3235*** 51501*** 608.1 51336*** 
 (1607) (3405) (1212) (3273) (902.3) (3201) 
Adult Proportion 6138*** 32663*** 3631*** 31987*** 413.5 31609*** 
 (1585) (3241) (1215) (3164) (905.6) (3190) 
Zero to Five Married -206.3 20181*** 449.5 20124*** 1465** 20742*** 
 (1140) (2155) (878.3) (2116) (669.4) (2157) 
More than Five Married -5906*** 36090*** -576.2 33230*** -15.54 33315*** 
 (1960) (4744) (1500) (4666) (1122) (4586) 
Years in Place -18049*** -1310 -4382*** -3122 -2360** -2901 
 (1652) (3906) (1245) (2957) (1004) (2939) 
Urban 34910*** -11428** 4710*** 633.3 6347*** 2105 
 (5639) (5197) (492.0) (1334) (529.2) (2175) 
Brahmin 4327* -13135** -500.9 -9021 -1165 -9415 
 (2564) (6389) (2204) (6255) (1645) (6196) 
Forward Caste -54.74 -13166** -2462 -6233 -1824 -6561 
 (2288) (5919) (2000) (5815) (1480) (5766) 
OBC -9982*** -14373** -1799 -15603*** -1591 -15789*** 
 (2246) (5951) (1969) (5771) (1468) (5722) 
SC -8592*** -26630*** -1439 -29471*** -1256 -29738*** 
 (2271) (5914) (1986) (5724) (1475) (5670) 
ST -22457*** -20986*** -2375 -26743*** -1589 -26562*** 
 (2356) (6596) (2093) (5979) (1540) (5914) 
Individual Idiosyncratic Shocks       
Job Loss -81.09 -83.47 -1,172 1,532 1,224 3,254 
 (1608) (2546) (1196) (2567) (890.1) (2905) 
Death 1875*** 4036*** 1605*** 3993*** 441.5 3713*** 






Table A3. IV Full Results (Continued)      
Variables [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] 
              
Theft -1181 15037*** 60.00 14329*** -342.7 14914*** 
 (1288) (2758) (931.4) (2762) (680.8) (2801) 
Break-in 5926** -2761 3307* -1328 2580 -1006 
 (2711) (6053) (1997) (5898) (1573) (5877) 
Contextual Effects       
Income   0.445*** -0.221*** 0.369*** -0.179** 
   (0.00500) (0.0576) (0.00539) (0.0832) 
Household Size   10608*** -6887*** 6699*** -6436*** 
   (410.7) (1637) (410.1) (1829) 
Age   -357.2*** -167.3 250.4*** -8.880 
   (60.46) (157.0) (51.40) (176.3) 
Male   -14157*** 3879 -21046*** -179.0 
   (3387) (8621) (3121) (10325) 
Literate   9868*** -15997*** 30500*** -8574 
   (1099) (3034) (1091) (7942) 
Married   7200** 1137 -1857 -866.5 
   (3447) (8066) (3116) (9133) 
Teenage Proportion   100107*** -30960* 58047*** -30183* 
   (4506) (17768) (3878) (17659) 
Adult Proportion   85786*** -14571 35349*** -17559 
   (4322) (15082) (4014) (13588) 
Zero to Five Married   27029*** -17062* 42488*** -7815 
   (3402) (9074) (3070) (13101) 
More than Five Married   24316*** -29606** 32488*** -23375 
   (5930) (13234) (5126) (16598) 
Years in Place   -60641*** -7443 -33491*** -9751 
   (3207) (11236) (3481) (12605) 
Brahmin   -15528*** 6391 -24836*** 1302 
   (4986) (11525) (4331) (14823) 
Forward Caste   -39230*** -79.35 -30292*** -3488 
   (4647) (11448) (3949) (13967) 
OBC   -39395*** 8925 -36399*** 3759 
   (4592) (11248) (3872) (14405) 
SC   -47856*** 21773* -45272*** 15216 
   (4613) (11668) (3878) (15240) 
ST   -58802*** 17160 -46567*** 11444 
   (4664) (12244) (3921) (15611) 
Peer Idiosyncratic Shocks       
Job Loss 3080  -10012***  24826***  
 (2974)  (2169)  (3059)  
Death 20410***  26768***  8794***  






Table A3. IV Full Results (Continued)      
Variables [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] 
              
Theft 4125  14160***  8228***  
 (3942)  (2898)  (2821)  
Break-in 70519***  51949***  41407***  
 (8989)  (6379)  (6093)  
Constant 104204*** -77597*** 32269*** 5243 3982 2296 
 (3,185) (17188) (6497) (16488) (6219) (20185) 
District Fixed Effects NO NO NO NO YES YES 
       
Observations 40980 40980 40980 40980 40980 40980 
Adjusted R-squared 0.259 0.305 0.576 0.321 0.766 0.325 
Hansen J statistic  6.096  4.355  1.829 
  [p=0.107]  [p=0.226]  [p=0.609] 
Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistic  147.5  339.9  154.8 
  [p=0.000]  [p=0.000]  [p=0.000] 
First stage F-statistic   38.03   89.97   40.01 
 
 
Notes: Estimation via two-step GMM. Dependent variable is Household Annual Total Consumption Expenditure. Endogenous Peer 
Effect represents the estimated coefficient of Average Peer Household Annual Total Consumption Expenditure. For full list of 
demographic characteristic, idiosyncratic shocks and definition of variables see Table 1 and note below Table 2.  Heteroscedasticity 
robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
Table A4. Peer Effects in Consumption: Consumption in Logs and 
Endogenous Income 
Variables [1] [2] 
   
Endogenous Peer Effect 0.639*** 0.634*** 
 (0.157) (0.241) 
   
Observations 40980 40980 
Adjusted R-squared 0.568 0.155 
Hansen J statistic 1.454 1.761 
 [p=0.693] [p=0.623] 
Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistic 264.9 134.4 
 [p=0.000] [p=0.000] 
First stage F-statistic   
    Mean Peer Consumption 71.29 182.97 
    Household Income  58.18 
    Mean Peer Income   135.81 
 
 
Notes: Estimation via two-step GMM. For the specification reported in 
column [1], the dependent variable is log of Household Annual Total 
Consumption Expenditure and the Endogenous Peer Effect represents 
the estimated coefficient of log of Average Peer Household Annual 
Total Consumption Expenditure. For the specification reported in 
column [2], the dependent variable is Household Annual Total 
Consumption Expenditure and the Endogenous Peer Effect represents 
the estimated coefficient of Average Peer Household Annual Total 
Consumption Expenditure. Both specifications include controls for 
household effects, own idiosyncratic shocks, contextual effects and 
district fixed effects. Household effects are controlled by own 
demographic characteristics of households. Contextual effects are 
controlled by average peer demographic characteristics. Own and 
Average Peer Income are instrumented in the specification reported in 
column (2).  For full list of demographic characteristics, idiosyncratic 
shocks, instruments and definition of variables see Table 1, note below 
Table 2 and main text. Heteroscedasticity robust standard errors in 
parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
Table A5. Peer Effects in Consumption: Investigating IV Exclusion 
Variables [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] 
              
Endogenous Peer Effect 0.667** 0.921*** 0.445 0.879*** 0.551 0.769** 
 (0.329) (0.348) (0.493) (0.287) (0.356) (0.317) 
Peer Idiosyncratic shocks (Instruments)      
Job Loss 1257 -3965 7170    
 (13307) (13541) (16503)    
Death 643.2   -1139 1973  
 (5566)   (5579) (6033)  
Theft  -12946  -12609  -12230 
  (10010)  (9876)  (9546) 
Break-in   16226  12361 9378 
   (26993)  (23571) (21086) 
       
Observations 40980 40980 40980 40980 40980 40980 
Adjusted R-squared 0.327 0.310 0.335 0.313 0.332 0.321 
Hansen J statistic 1.821 0.109 1.493 0.153 1.568 3.25e-05 
 [p=0.177] [p=0.742] [p=0.222] [p=0.695] [p=0.211] [p=0.995] 
Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistic 69.69 66.46 42.22 101.8 80.03 91.62 
 [p=0.000] [p=0.000] [p=0.000] [p=0.000] [p=0.000] [p=0.000] 
First stage F-statistic 36.11 33.92 20.94 52.34 40.67 47.80 
 
Notes: Estimation via two-step GMM. Dependent variable is Household Annual Total Consumption Expenditure. Endogenous Peer 
Effect represents the estimated coefficient of Average Peer Household Annual Total Consumption Expenditure. All specifications 
include controls for household effects, own idiosyncratic shocks, contextual effects and district fixed effects. Household effects are 
controlled by own demographic characteristics of households. Contextual effects are controlled by average peer demographic 
characteristics. For full list of demographic characteristic, idiosyncratic shocks and definition of variables see Table 1 and note 
below Table 2.  Heteroscedasticity robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
Table A6. Peer Effects in Consumption: Alternative Instrument Based on ‘Positive’ Peer Idiosyncratic Shock 
Variables   [1]   [2] 
  
Instrument based on a binary 
variable indicating whether peer 
household faced a positive 
income shock (due to lottery, 
dowry or chit fund)  
Positive income shock instrument + 
baseline instruments 
     
Endogenous Peer Effect  0.601***  0.705*** 
  (0.229)  (0.114) 
     
Observations  40,980  40,980 
Adjusted R-squared  0.333  0.329 
Hansen J statistic    1.603 
    [p= 0.808] 
Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistic  167.625  558.615 
  [p=0.000]  [p=0.000] 
First stage F-statistic   151.81   113.82 
 
Notes: Estimation via two-step GMM. Dependent variable is Household Annual Total Consumption Expenditure. First 
column report results of regression where only one instrument - based on a binary variable indicating whether peer 
household faced a positive income shock (due to lottery, dowry or chit fund) - is used. Second column report results of 
regression where all baseline instrumental variables are used along with the new instrumental variable. Endogenous Peer 
Effect represents the estimated coefficient of Average Peer Household Annual Total Consumption Expenditure. All 
specifications include controls for household effects, own idiosyncratic shocks, contextual effects and state fixed effects. 
Household effects are controlled by own demographic characteristics of households. Contextual effects are controlled by 
average peer demographic characteristics. For full list of demographic characteristics, idiosyncratic shocks and definition 
of variables see Table 1 and note below Table 2.  Heteroscedasticity robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** 
p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
Table A7. Peer Effects in Consumption: Excluding Recent Migrant-Households  
Variables   [1]   [2] 
  
Excluding 
households who have 
been living in their 
current village/ 
neighborhood for < 
10 years  
Excluding 
households who have 
been living in their 
current village/ 
neighborhood for < 
20 years 
     
Endogenous Peer Effect  0.741***  0.801*** 
  (0.207)  (0.194) 
     
Observations  40,024   38,261 
Adjusted R-squared  0.327  0.319 
Hansen J statistic  2.312   2.109 
  [p=0.510]  [p=0.550] 
Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistic   171.752  174.996 
  [p=0.000]  [p=0.000] 
First stage F-statistic   44.79   45.64  
 
Notes: Estimation via two-step GMM. Dependent variable is Household Annual Total 
Consumption Expenditure. Endogenous Peer Effect represents the estimated coefficient of 
Average Peer Household Annual Total Consumption Expenditure. All specifications include 
controls for household effects, own idiosyncratic shocks, contextual effects and district fixed 
effects. Household effects are controlled by own demographic characteristics of households. 
Contextual effects are controlled by average peer demographic characteristics. For full list of 
demographic characteristics, idiosyncratic shocks and definition of variables see Table 1 and 
note below Table 2.  Heteroscedasticity robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** 
p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
Table A8. Peer Effects in Consumption: Including Controls for Price Index 
Variables   [1]   [2] 
  
With controls for 
household level 
and neighborhood 
level price index  
Consumption 
expenditure 
deflated by price 
index 
     
Endogenous Peer Effect  0.722***   0.685*** 
  (0.216)   (0.198) 
     
Observations  40,554  40,523 
Adjusted R-squared  0.3338  0.294 
Hansen J statistic   1.687   0.875 
  [p=0.6399]  [p= 0.832] 
Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistic   165.908  204.062 
  [p=0.000]  [p=0.000] 
First stage F-statistic   43.18   52.69 
 
 
Notes: Estimation via two-step GMM. Dependent variable is Household Annual Total 
Consumption Expenditure. Endogenous Peer Effect represents the estimated coefficient 
of Average Peer Household Annual Total Consumption Expenditure. All specifications 
include controls for household effects, own idiosyncratic shocks, contextual effects and 
district fixed effects. Household effects are controlled by own demographic characteristics 
of households. Contextual effects are controlled by average peer demographic 
characteristics. For full list of demographic characteristics, idiosyncratic shocks and 
definition of variables see Table 1 and note below Table 2.  Heteroscedasticity robust 
standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
Table A9. Peer Effects in Consumption: Excluding Households based on Migration 
Pattern and Using Sample Weights 
Variables   [1]   [2] 
  
Excluding 
households who have 




     
Endogenous Peer Effect  0.640***  0.825*** 
  (0.237)  (0.178) 
     
Observations  37,615  40,980 
Adjusted R-squared   0.333   0.333 
Hansen J statistic   0.927   0.438 
  [p=0.819]  [p= 0.932] 
Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistic  136.213  157.400 
  [p=0.000]  [p=0.000] 
First stage F-statistic   34.55   52.31 
 
Notes: Estimation via two-step GMM. Dependent variable is Household Annual Total 
Consumption Expenditure. Endogenous Peer Effect represents the estimated coefficient of 
Average Peer Household Annual Total Consumption Expenditure. All specifications include 
controls for household effects, own idiosyncratic shocks, contextual effects and district fixed 
effects. Household effects are controlled by own demographic characteristics of households. 
Contextual effects are controlled by average peer demographic characteristics. For full list of 
demographic characteristics, idiosyncratic shocks and definition of variables see Table 1 and 
note below Table 2.  Heteroscedasticity robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** 
p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
Table A10. Peer Effects in Consumption: Disaggregate Analysis    
    Expenditure Categories 
Variables  Food  
Temptation 
Good Health  Education  
           
Mean Peer Total Consumption Expenditure  0.125***    0.482***        0.055 0.006 
    (0.0418) (0.173) (0.071) (0.046) 
      
Observations  40980 40980 40980 40980 
Adjusted R-squared  0.562 0.186 0.0220 0.143 
Hansen J statistic  2.472 1.557 3.677 4.417 
  [p=0.480] [p=0.669] [p=0.299] [p=0.220] 
Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistic  154.800 154.800 154.800 154.800 
  [p=0.000] [p=0.000] [p=0.000] [p=0.000] 
First stage F-statistic   40.01 40.01 40.01 40.01 
 
 
Notes: Estimation via two-step GMM. Dependent variable for regression reported in each column is the 
respective expenditure category. All specifications include controls for household effects, own idiosyncratic 
shocks, contextual effects and district fixed effects. Household effects are controlled by own demographic 
characteristics of households. Contextual effects are controlled by average peer demographic characteristics. For 
full list of demographic characteristic, idiosyncratic shocks and definition of variables see Table 1 and note below 
Table 2.  Heteroscedasticity robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
Table A11. Partial Risk Sharing: Subsample Analysis based on (Relative) Group Vulnerability 




















                 
Endogenous Peer Effect  0.806*** 0.897***  0.624*** 0.832**  0.629** 0.767*** 
  (0.193) (0.275)  (0.224) (0.323)  (0.261) (0.267) 
          
Observations  20403 20577  20584 20396  20235 20745 
Adjusted R-squared  0.178 0.190  0.170 0.217  0.236 0.177 
Hansen J statistic  0.376 1.712  0.923 1.371  0.876 0.883 
  [p=0.945] [p=0.634]  [p=0.820] [p=0.712]  [p=0.831] [p=0.830] 
Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistic  308.1 116.6  153.5 77.80  195.7 113.1 
  [p=0.000] [p=0.000]  [p=0.000] [p=0.000]  [p=0.000] [p=0.000] 
First stage F-statistic   94.37 30.34   41.26 19.79   50.22 30.25 
 
 
Notes: Estimation via two-step GMM. Dependent variable is Household Annual Total Consumption Expenditure. Endogenous Peer 
Effect represents the estimated coefficient of Average Peer Household Annual Total Consumption Expenditure. Subsample 
construction: More Vulnerable: Literacy includes those groups (villages/neighborhoods) with proportion of illiterate households above 
the sample group-median level (where the group median level is calculated as the median of the proportion of illiterate households 
over all groups in the sample). Less Vulnerable: Literacy includes those groups with proportion of illiterate households below the 
sample group-median level. More Vulnerable: Caste includes those groups with proportion of low caste households above the sample 
group-median level. Less Vulnerable: Caste includes those groups with proportion of low caste households below the sample group-
median level. More Vulnerable: Poverty includes those groups with proportion of below poverty line households above the sample 
group-median level. Less Vulnerable: Poverty includes those groups with proportion of below poverty households below the sample 
group-median level. All specifications include controls for household effects, own idiosyncratic shocks, contextual effects and district 
fixed effects. Household effects are controlled by own demographic characteristics of households. Contextual effects are controlled 
by average peer demographic characteristics. For full list of demographic characteristic, idiosyncratic shocks, definition of variables 
and definition of each subsample see Table 1, note below Table 2 and main text.  Heteroscedasticity robust standard errors in 
parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
Table A12. Partial Risk Sharing: Subsample Analysis based on (Relative) Group Heterogeneity 




















                 
Endogenous Peer Effect  0.950*** 0.742***  1.140*** 0.644***  0.731* 0.737*** 
  (0.280) (0.228)  (0.415) (0.223)  (0.415) (0.235) 
          
Observations  16938 24042  13586 27394  9516 31464 
Adjusted R-squared  0.180 0.187  0.155 0.205  0.204 0.206 
Hansen J statistic  1.973 0.159  0.618 2.938  1.620 1.781 
  [p=0.578] [p=0.984]  [p=0.892] [p=0.401]  [p=0.655] [p=0.619] 
Kleibergen-Paap rk LM 
statistic  94.92 197.5  50.56 138.5  108.1 136.8 
  [p=0.000] [p=0.000]  [p=0.000] [p=0.000]  [p=0.000] [p=0.000] 
First stage F-statistic   25.58 51.44   13.54 36.56   30.06 35.07 
 
 
Notes: Estimation via two-step GMM. Dependent variable is Household Annual Total Consumption Expenditure. Endogenous Peer Effect represents the 
estimated coefficient of Average Peer Household Annual Total Consumption Expenditure. Subsample construction: More Heterogeneous: Literacy 
includes those groups (villages/neighborhoods) with proportion of illiterate households between 0.25 and 0.75. Less Heterogeneous: Literacy includes 
those groups with proportion of illiterate households below 0.25 or above 0.75. More Heterogeneous: Caste includes those groups with proportion of low 
caste households between 0.25 and 0.75. Less Heterogeneous: Caste includes those groups with proportion of low caste households below 0.25 or above 
0.75. More Heterogeneous: Poverty includes those groups with proportion of below poverty line households between 0.25 and 0.75. Less Heterogeneous: 
Poverty includes those groups with proportion of below poverty households below 0.25 or above 0.75. All specifications include controls for household 
effects, own idiosyncratic shocks, contextual effects and district fixed effects. Household effects are controlled by own demographic characteristics of 
households. Contextual effects are controlled by average peer demographic characteristics. For full list of demographic characteristic, idiosyncratic shocks, 
definition of variables and definition of each subsample see Table 1, note below Table 2 and main text.  Heteroscedasticity robust standard errors in 
parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
